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Identifying and Keeping the Genie in the Bottle: The Practical and Legal
Realities of Trade Secrets in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Abstract
Anyone who has been paid attention to developments in the world of business over the past quarter century
can attest to the fact that intellectual property (IP) is a hot commodity. Indeed, in contrast to the companies
that emerged out of the Industrial Revolution, the companies that have spawned as part of the so-called
“Information Age” attribute much of their value and future prospects to intangible, rather than tangible, assets.
Unfortunately, while bankruptcy courts have generally recognized the need to distinguish between tangible
and intangible assets, particularly when determining whether a claim is secured or unsecured, they often fail to
acknowledge the practical and legal differences between the various forms of IP. Not all forms of IP are created
equal. Trade secrets, in particular, present a challenge for the bankruptcy courts because, by definition, they
must be “secret.” Thus, the very act of identifying and attempting to place a value on trade secrets may result in
the loss of such rights.
A number of recent articles have addressed the treatment of IP assets in bankruptcy proceedings. Typically,
these articles focus on two important aspects of bankruptcy law as it relates to intellectual property generally:
(1) how to perfect a security interest in intellectual property assets, i.e., “general intangibles” in the parlance of
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“the U.C.C".), and (2) the treatment of executory contracts
involving intellectual property assets. While both of these issues are important, they are meaningless with
respect to trade secrets unless the trade secrets continue to exist after the bankruptcy petition is filed. Thus,
rather than jump to a discussion of security interests and executory contracts as they relate to trade secrets,
this article begins with a discussion of trade secret law and how various trade secret issues may arise in the
bankruptcy context. Because the nature of the relationships in which trade secrets are disclosed is a key aspect
of trade secret law, the article then proceeds to explore the interests and objectives of the various players in a
bankruptcy proceeding, including the debtor, the trustee, creditors, licensees, and other third parties. The
article concludes with a discussion of the interests of the unsecured creditors, employees of the debtor, and
the buyer of estate assets.
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I. INTRODUCION
Anyone who has paid attention to developments in the world of business over
the past quarter century knows that intellectual property ("IP") is a hot commodity.
Indeed, in contrast to companies that emerged from the Industrial Revolution, many
of the companies spawned during the Information Age attribute much of their value
and prospects to intangible, rather than tangible, assets.' Pursuant to IP theory, this
shift in focus should have the desirable effect of encouraging more inventive and
creative activity. From a practical point of view, it has created a situation where the
value of a company can be more "smoke and mirrors" than real.
The ethereal nature of IP should be of particular concem to the parties to a
bankruptcy proceeding because a principal focus in such cases is the identification
and distribution of the assets of the debtor's estate. If, as some companies represent to
their shareholders, creditors, and others, IP rights make up a major portion of a
company's assets, then it is important for bankruptcy judges, trustees, and creditors to
be able to identify, secure, and properly value such assets. Unfortunately, while
bankruptcy courts and commentators have recognized the need to distinguish
between tangible assets and IP rights, particularly when determining whether a claim
against the bankruptcy estate is secured or unsecured,2 they often fail to acknowledge
the practical and legal differences between the various forms of intellectual property.
3
4Not all forms of IP are created equal. For instance, while existing patent rights and
pending patent applications are documented in writings that are available over the
Internet, the same cannot be said for copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.5 Trade
secrets, in particular, present a challenge for bankruptcy courts because they do not
1. See Marjorie Chertok & Warren E. Agin, Restart.com: Identifying, Securing and
Maximizing the Liquidation Value of Cyber-Assets in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 8 AM. BANKR. INsT.
L. REv. 255, 255-63 (2000) (describing the "typical" assets of Internet companies' as "virtual"); see
also U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42) (2000) (defining "general intangibles").
2. See notes 239-253 and 255-257 infra and accompanying text.
3. Lars S. Smith, Trade Secrets in Commercial Transactions and Bankruptcy, 40 IDEA:
THE JOURNAL OF LAw AND TECHNOLOGY 549, 549-550 (2000) ("While much has been written about
issues surrounding security interests in patents, trademarks and copyrights, trade secrets are often
ignored or dealt with superficially.").
4. Congress recognized some of the differences when it enacted section 365(n) of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1988 and noted the need to treat trademark rights different from patent,
copyright, and trade secret rights. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2000); see also 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2000)
(defining "intellectual property" to include copyrights, patents, and trade secrets, but not trademarks);
Hon. William L. Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton, 111, 9 NORTON BANKRUprcY LAWAND PRACrICE §
177 (3rd ed. 2008) [hereinafter NORTON]. Unfortunately, Congress did not similarly recognize the
unique features of trade secret law.
5. J. Thomas McCarthy, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMIErmON § 2.7
(4th ed. 2008) (While copyrights and trademarks are likely to exist in some tangible form, contrary to
popular belief, they need not be registered with federal authorities to be valid).
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always exist in tangible form and, by definition, they must be kept secret.6 Thus, the
very act of identifying and attempting to place a value on them may result in the loss
of such rights.7
A number of articles have addressed the treatment of IP assets in bankruptcy
proceedings. 8 Typically, these articles focus on two important aspects of bankruptcy
law as it relates to IP: (1) how to perfect a security interest in IP assets, i.e., "general
intangibles" in the parlance of Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (the
"U.C.C."), and (2) the treatment of executory contracts involving IP assets.9 Rather
than focus on a discussion of security interests and executory contracts as they relate
to trade secrets, this article takes a broader approach by examining additional trade
secret related issues that may arise in a bankruptcy proceeding.
The analysis of how trade secrets are treated in bankruptcy begins in section H]
with a discussion of the intersection of bankruptcy and trade secret law. The article
then explores the interests and objectives of the various players in a bankruptcy case.
In order of involvement, section I1 examines the interests of the debtor. Next, in
section IV, the interests of the bankruptcy trustee (including a debtor in possession)
are discussed.' 0 Given that the interests of the debtor and trustee may vary depending
upon whether the bankruptcy petition is filed under chapter 7 (liquidation)," chapter
11 (reorganization), 12 or chapter 13 (individual), 13 the differing laws and rules
applicable to each chapter are discussed where appropriate.
Beginning with section V, the article explores the interests of creditors and other
third parties. Befitting their special status, section V focuses on secured creditors and
addresses how to perfect security interests in trade secrets. Because bankruptcy
debtors are often the licensors of trade secrets, section VI examines bankruptcy
proceedings through the eyes of a licensee. It is in sections III and VI where the
treatment of executory contracts involving trade secrets is discussed. As will be seen,
6. See NORTON, supra note 4, § 177:14, at 177-19.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Peter S. Menell, Bankruptcy Treatment of Intellectual Property Assets: An
Economic Analysis, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 733, 790 (2007); Smith, supra note 3, at 549; Alice
Haemmerli, Insecurity Interests: Where Intellectual Property and Commercial Law Collide, 96
CoLuM. L. REv. 1645 (1996); William, Mary Survey, Survey: The Treatment ofIntellectual Property
Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 391 (May/June 1995); Robert M. Bramson,
Intellectual Property as Collateral- Patents, Trade Secrets, Trademarks and Copyrights, 36 Bus.
LAW 1567 (1981).
9. See supra note 8.
10. According to section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor in possession in a Chapter
11 proceeding has the same rights, powers, and duties of a trustee, other than the right to
compensation under section 330. 11 U.S.C. § 1107(a) (2000). Thus, the debtor in possession wears
two hats: that of the debtor and of the trustee. Unless otherwise noted, reference in this article to the
bankruptcy trustee will include the debtor in possession.
11. 11 U.S.C. § 701 etseq. (2000).
12. 11 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq. (2000).
13. 11 U.S.C. § 1301 etseq. (2000).
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courts have yet to fully examine many of the issues concerning trade secrets that can
arise in a bankruptcy proceeding.
H. THE TRADE SECRET BANKRUPTCY INTERFACE
Although the term "intellectual property" is now a fixture of the American
lexicon, it is not a term that is well understood by the public or by many lawyers and
judges. In general, it refers to four bodies of law: patent, copyright, trademark, and
trade secret law. Patent and copyright law both find explicit support in the U.S.
Constitution and are exclusively governed by federal law.14 Trademark law, although
often compared to patent and copyright law, does not share the same constitutional
origins or purpose.15 Rather, it developed at common law as part of the law of unfair
competition and is currently governed by a mix of common law and state and federal
statutes. 16 Trade secret law is more akin to trademark law because it too developed at
common law.'7 As originally conceived, the purpose of trademark and trade secret
law was not to protect property per se, but to prevent competitors from engaging in
activities that exceed the bounds of legitimate competition.'8
Unfortunately, although patent, copyright, trademark, and trade secret law have
distinct jurisdictional roots and purposes, they are often lumped together in
bankruptcy cases as if they form one amorphous asset.19 This is a mistake. Because
the law governing each of the four different types of IP protects different (albeit
sometimes overlapping) subject matter, has differing requirements for protection,
requires different documentation, provides protection for different lengths of time,
and gives the owner different rights, they each require separate attention. This is
particularly true of trade secrets because the failure to exercise reasonable efforts to
protect the trade secrets will result in their loss.
20
14. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2000); Copyright Act, 17
U.S.C. § 101 etseq. (2000).
15. See Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 85, 93, 99 (1879).
16. McCARTHY, supra note 5.
17. See generally ROGER MILGRIM, MILGRIM ON TRADE SECRETS § 1.01[1] (2002). See also
Wolfe v. Tuthill Corp., 532 N.E.2d 1, 2 (Ind. 1998) (finding that the UTSA "merely articulates the
common law").
18. McCARTHY, supra note 5, at § 5.2, "Development of trademarks in Anglo-American
common law" (noting that trademark infringement and unfair competition have their roots in
common law notions of fraud and deceit); see also JAMES POOLEY, TRADE SECRETS, § 1.02[2] (2000)
(("Ethics in business is one of the two primary policy concerns (along with encouragement of
invention) that underlie trade secret law.").
19. See, e.g., In re Arrmica, Inc. 135 BR. 534 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1992); In re American Motor
Club, Inc., 119 B.R. 394 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1990); see also Smith, supra note 3, at 549-50 ("While
much has been written about the issues surrounding security interests in patents, trademarks and
copyrights, trade secrets are often ignored or dealt with superficially. Most articles focus on federally
created and protected intellectual property.").
20. UNiF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985) (defining "trade secret").
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In the following subsections, the unique nature of trade secrets is discussed in
relation to the various stages of a bankruptcy proceeding.
A. Stage One: The Filing of a Petition in Bankruptcy and the Creation of the
Bankruptcy Estate (Are Trade Secrets "Property "for Purposes of Bankruptcy Law?)
A bankruptcy proceeding is commenced in one of two ways: voluntarily by the
debtor or involuntarily by creditors. Generally, when a bankruptcy petition is filed a
new entity - the "bankruptcy estate" - is created consisting of the debtor's property
"wherever located and by whomever held. 2 The key to understanding what is in the
bankruptcy estate depends upon what the Bankruptcy Code means by property.
Although property is not explicitly defined in the Bankruptcy Code, section 541(a)
sets forth a litany of seven categories of property interests that are part of the estate
including "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the
commencement of the case.',23 Nowhere in this litany is there a specific reference to
IP or trade secrets. In the absence of such reference, the obvious question is: Are trade
secrets property for purposes of bankruptcy law? This is not just an academic
question but, as is discussed in the remainder of this article, one that can have
24significant ramifications for the outcome of a bankruptcy case.
Whether trade secrets are property for any purpose, let alone bankruptcy law, is a
topic that has occupied the attention of legal scholars and the judiciary for well over
25one hundred years. The reason for the debate centers on the unfair competition roots
21. George M. Treister, et al, FUNDAMENTALS Or BANKRuFTcY LAW, § 3.02 (6th ed. 2006)
(citing 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 and noting that pursuant to § 302 a case may also be filed jointly by a
debtor and the debtor's spouse) (hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS IN BANKRUPTCY].
22. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000). See also NORTON, supra note 4, §177:25, at 177-39.
23. 11 U.S.C. § 54 1(a). As explained in Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law.
The concept of an "interest" for the purpose of this section is not limited. It may be title or
the fee if in nontechnical terms the debtor owns the property; a limited or life estate; a
leasehold interest; a contract right; a lien if the debtor is a secured creditor of someone
else; a mere possessory right; or any other kind of interest that derives from the debtor's
relationship to property.
FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 21, § 4.01 (a), at 141.
24. In Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law, the statement is made that the characterization of a
debtor's books, papers, or other recorded information is an academic exercise because, in any event,
the debtor is required by the Bankruptcy Code to turnover all of its records. Id. However, as will be
seen, trade secrets and other "proprietary information" of a debtor do not always exist in a tangible or
documented form and thus, their characterization as property or not will determine if they are a part
of the bankruptcy estate. See infra Part HA.
25. See MILGRIM, supra note 17, at § 2.01 (arguing that trade secrets are no less property
than copyrights but acknowledging the historical debate); E.I. du Pont de Nemours Powder Co. v.
Masland, 244 U.S. 100, 102 (1917) ("The property may be denied, but the confidence cannot be.
Therefore the starting point for the present matter is not property or due process of law, but that the
defendant stood in confidential relations with the plaintiffs, or one of them."); POOLEY, supra note 18,
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of trade secret law and the required elements of a claim for relief.26 Like patents,
copyrights, and trademarks, the metes and bounds of trade secrets are defined, not by
rules that are applicable to tangible personal property, but by the scope and limits of
trade secret law.27 Unlike claims related to personal property, claims for relief under
trade secret law are not solely dependent upon how the asserted property interest is
affected. They are also dependent upon the nature of the relationship that exists
between the trade secret owner and the defendant.28 In this respect, trade secret law
has more to do with preventing wrongful and unfair actions than protecting
29property. This limitation on the scope of trade secret law is not an antiquated feature
of the law that can be ignored but is a feature of trade secret law that prevents it from
being preempted by patent law.
30
at § 1.02[8] (discussing the confidence v. property debate of trade secret law and concluding that
trade secret law has aspects of both); Charles Tait Graves, Trade Secrets as Property: Theory and
Consequences, 15 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 39 (2007) (citing the benefits of a property approach from the
perspective of mobile employees); Michael Risch, Why Do We Have Trade Secrets?, 11 MARQ.
INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 1 (2007); Sharon K. Sandeen, Relative Privacy: What Privacy Advocates Can
Learn from Trade Secret Law, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 667 (2006) (detailing the origins of trade secret
law in the United States); Robert G Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Law: Doctrine in Search of
Justification, 86 CAL. L. REV. 241, 254 (1998) (arguing that the historical basis for trade secret law
was a formalistic view of property: "it is enough to note that late nineteenth century courts and
commentators ... reasoned formalistically from an ideal conception of "property" linked to the
concept of exclusive control."); David D. Friedman, William L. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Some
Economics of Trade Secret Law, 5 J. ECON. PERsP. 61 (1991); Pamela Samuelson, Information as
Property: Do Ruckelshaus and Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property
Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 365 (1989); see also Mark A. Lenley, Property, Intellectual Property, and
Free Riding, 83 TEx. L. REv. 1031 (2005); Michael A. Carier, Cabining Intellectual Property
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1 (2004); Wendy J. Gordon, On Owning Information:
Intellectual Property and the Restitutionary Impulse, 78 VA. L. REV. 149, 178-79 (1992).
26. Samuelson, supra note 25, at 367-68.
27. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Because of the intangible
nature of a trade secret, the extent of the property right therein is defined by the extent to which the
owner of the secret protects his interest from disclosure to others.").
28. It is for this reason that Pamela Samuelson noted that trade secret law has generally
resisted characterizing trade secrets as property. See Samuelson, supra note 25, at 365; see also
NORTON, supra note 4, at § 177:14 (noting the there is no "absolute property right" in trade secrets).
But see MILGRIM, supra note 17, at § 2.01 (noting that "[t]he property right in anything is always a
relational right, i.e., the right that an owner may have vis-a-vis the world.").
29. See Menell, supra note 8, at 735; see also In re Uniservices, Inc., 517 Fed. 2d 492, 496
(7th Cir. 1975) (noting the need to balance a debtor's property interests in information with the right
of individuals to engage in business.).
30. See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 493 (1974); see also Sharon K.
Sandeen, Kewanee Revisted: Returning to First Principles of Intellectual Property Law to Determine
the Issue of Federal Preemption, 12 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REy. 299, 317-18 (2008); Pamela
Samuelson, Principles for Resolving Conflicts Between Trade Secrets and the First Amendment, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 777, 805 (2007) (noting that making trade secret law more property-like will increase
the likelihood of federal preemption).
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Despite the historical origins of trade secret law, there are aspects of trade secrets
that are property-like in nature. By virtue of the value that is placed on trade secrets,
they are often the subject of purchase and sale agreements, license agreements,
confidentiality and non-compete agreements, and security agreements. Because they
can and have been bought, sold, licensed, and used as security, many courts have
treated them as a form of personal property.31 In the case of Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto
Co., for instance, the U.S. Supreme Court treated the trade secrets of Monsanto as
property for purposes of determining if they had been taken without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. 32 The decision was based, in part,
upon a bankruptcy case in which the court applied state law to determine whether the
bankruptcy estate had a property interest in the debtor's trade secrets.33 However,
while Ruckelshaus supports the assertion that information that qualifies for trade
secret protection under the law of Missouri is property for purposes of the Fifth
Amendment, it cannot be cited for the proposition that trade secrets are property for
all other purposes.34 To determine whether something is property under bankruptcy
law requires the application of state law and bankruptcy principles.
35
At the time of Ruckelshaus, the predominant law governing trade secrets was
36described in the Restatement (First) of Torts. Today, the predominant law is the
Uniform Trade Secrets Act (the UTSA) which has been adopted in substantial part by
31. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002; Picker Int'l Corp. v. Imaging Equip. Servs.,
931 F. Supp. 18, 35 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1995) (definition of a trade secret as a property interest); Painton
& Co. v. Bourns, Inc., 442 F.2d 216, 225 (2d Cir. 1971) (royalties for trade secrets should be
enforced); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 82 cmt. (e) (1959) (a trade secret can forn the res of
a trust). See also MILGRIM, supra note 17, at § 2.02 and cases cited therein.
32. Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1003-04 (applying Missouri law).
33. Id. at 1002 (citing In re Uniservices, 517 F.2d at 496 (applying the pre-Uniform Trade
Secret Act trade secret principles of Indiana)).
34. Because the decision in Ruckelshaus is based upon an expansive reading of the word
"property" as used in the Fifth Amendment, it is conceivable that its definition is not coextensive with
the concept of property that is used in the Bankruptcy Code. See id. at 1003-04 (noting that the
finding of a property interest was only "to the extent that Monsanto has an interest in its health,
safety, and environmental data cognizable as a trade-secret property right under Missouri law"). This
question was answered with respect to the meaning of "property" under U.S. securities law in the
case of Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 28 (1987) (where the Court recognized the property
right of the Wall Street Journal in the contents of a columnist's work).
35. Rucldeshaus, 467 U.S. at 1001 ("we are mindful of the basic axiom that '[property
interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rathdr, they are created and their dimensions are
defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state
law.'") (citations omitted); see also NORTON, supra note 4, § 177:14, at 177-21. In the bankruptcy
context, see Burner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (holding that property interests are
generally created by state law). Some states have adopted statutes that specifically define trade
secrets as property. See, e.g., Credentials Plus, LLC v. Calderone, 230 F. Supp.2d. 890, 903 (N.D.
Ind. 2002) (quoting the law of Indiana); In re Estate of Kuba, 660 E Supp. 1069, 1074 (N.D. Ind.
1986) (quoting the law of Indiana).
36. RESTATEMENT(FIRST) OFTORTS §§ 757-59 (1939).
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45 of the 50 United States.37 The UTSA provides that a broad range of information
can qualify for trade secret protection. 38 This includes classic business secrets such as
customer lists, methods of manufacture, and formulas but may also include computer
code and negative know-how.39 The UTSA does not explicitly classify trade secrets
as "property" but instead focuses on defining the meaning of a trade secret and the
circumstances under which trade secrets can be misappropriated. 4
To qualify for trade secret protection, information must satisfy three conditions:
(1) it must be secret, i.e., not generally known or readily ascertainable; (2) it must
derive independent economic value from its secrecy; and (3) it must be the subject of
41efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.  Due to
the strict requirements for trade secret protection, proprietary and confidential
42information that many businesses claim to own may not qualify as trade secrets.
For example, although absolute secrecy is not required, the failure of a putative
trade secret owner to limit the dissemination of its trade secrets can mean that no
37. Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts about the Uniform Trade Secrets Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact-factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utsa.asp (last visited: March 5,
2008).
In its discussion of the trade secret/bankruptcy interface, Norton Bankruptcy Law and Practice
erroneously states that "the most commonly accepted definition of a trade secret is that found in the
Restatement of Torts, section 757, comment b." NORTON, supra note 4, at § 177:14, at 177-19. See
also MILGRIM, supra note 17. What this statement fails to recognize is that the scope and meaning of
trade secrets was consciously altered by the drafters of the UTSA. See Sharon K. Sandeen, A
Contract by Any Other Name is Still a Contract.- Examining the Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses
to Protect Databases, 45 IDEA: THE INTELL. PROP. L. REv. 119, 126-32 (2005) (explaining the limits
of modem trade secret law).
38. UNIF. TRADE SECRETS AcT (1986) § 1 (" 'Trade secret' means information, including a
formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process.").
39. MILGRIM, supra note 17, at §§ 1.09[3], [5][b].
40. "For liability to exist under this Act, a Section 1(4) trade secret must exist and either a
person's acquisition of the trade secret, disclosure of the trade secret to others, or use of the trade
secret must be improper under Section 1(2). The mere copying of an unpatented item is not
actionable." UNF. TRADE SECRETS ACT, Prefatory Note.
41. Id. at § 1 (defining "trade secret"). Although the Restatement (First) of Torts definition of
trade secrets and its "six factor test" continue to be cited with favor by courts and commentators, the
drafters of the UTSA consciously chose to change the definition of trade secrets and, thus, in states
that have adopted the UTSA, it is error to rely upon the Restatement (First) definition. See Sandeen,
supra note 37, at 129-130.
42. See NORTON, supra note 4, § 177:14, at 177-20 - 177-21 ("Similar to, but distinctive
from, trade secrets may be confidential or proprietary research or development information which
does not rise to the level of the judicial definition of a "trade secret" but nevertheless represents real
effort which is deserving of protection.") It is also clear that a person's general knowledge and skill,
even if acquired while in the employ of one company, does not constitute protectable trade secrets.
See In re Dana Corp, No. 06-10354, 2007 Bankr. LEXIS 3923, at *20-21 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 6, 2007).
See also Reed Roberts Assoc. v. Strauman, 40 N.Y.2d 303, 307-09 (NY 1976); Marietta Corp. v.
Fairhurst, 301 A.D.2d 734, 736-38 (N.Y. 2003).
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trade secrets ever existed or that they were quickly lost.43 Even if a secret is known
only within a company, it may be shared with too many people within a company to
qualify for trade secret status.44 Similarly, even if information is a closely guarded
secret within a company, it may have no economic value outside of that company
and, therefore, will fail to satisfy the economic value requirement of the UTSA.45
Finally, although information may have been a trade secret at one time, it can lose its
trade secret status at any time through no fault of the owner of the information, such
as if the secret is reverse engineered or discovered through independent research and
thereafter disseminated to the public.46
From the perspective of an ongoing business enterprise, the distinction between
trade secrets and mere confidential information may make little practical difference
until it initiates a lawsuit for trade secret misappropriation. Then, it must plead and
prove the existence of trade secrets. The distinction will also mean a great deal to the
parties involved in bankruptcy proceedings because the characterization of the
information will determine how it is administered.4 7 If information constitutes trade
secrets, then the trustee (or the debtor in possession) should take reasonable steps to
43. MILGRIM, supra note 17, at § 1.07[2], n. 11 (explaining that while absolute secrecy is not
generally required, relative secrecy is a question of fact "within the sound discretion of the trier of
fact"); id. at § 2.01[2] (describing trade secrets conceptually as "evaporating" or "disappearing"
property rights, for example, when a trade secret becomes generally known, or a trademark
"disappears" as it becomes used generically, or when an owner of a patent loses his or her
"monopoly" to make, use, or sell a patented invention after the patent grant expires). See also
Rockwell Graphics Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., 925 E2d. 174, 195 (7th Cir. 1991) (examining whether
the plaintiff tried "hard enough" to keep its infonnation secret).
44. MiLGRIM, supra note 17, at § 1.04 ("If trade secrets are readily accessible to employees
not having a legitimate employment need for them, the secrecy element required for protection might
be impaired"); Pub. Relation Aids, Inc. v. Wagner, 37 A.D.2d 293, 296-97 (N.Y. 1971) (finding no
trade secret status for a matter that almost all employees knew to be secret, instead of few selected
employees having the need to know and even if the matter was "ingenious"). See also Roger
Norman Coe, Keeping Trade Secrets Secret, 76 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 833, 835 (1994)
(explaining that "a practice inside a company may be so commonly practiced in that company that
employees assume that everyone in the industry knows the same information and that no trade secret
exists"); Michael A. Epstein & Stuart D. Levi, Protecting Trade Secret Information: A Plan for
Proactive Strategy, 43 Bus. LAW. 887, 904-05 (1988) (advocating for informing employees of trade
secrets and using written company policies to make employees aware that they have access to trade
secrets).
45. See, e.g., Buffets, Inc v. Klinke, 73 E3d 965, 968-69 (9th Cir. 1996).
46. MILGRIM, supra note 17, at §§ 1.05[5] (discussing reverse engineering), 1.07 (discussing
secrecy). See also E.I. duPont deNemours & Co. v. Christopher, 431 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1970)
("[o]ne may use his competitor's secret process if he discovers the process by reverse engineering
applied to the finished product; one may use a competitor's process if he discovers it by his own
independent research"); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974); Chicago Lock
Co. v. Fanberg, 676 E2d 400,404 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. See infra Parts III and VI (discussing, among other things, executory contracts involving
the licensing of trade secrets should be handled differently from executory contracts involving the
licensing of mere confidential and proprietary information).
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48ensure that the information remains secret. If the information does not qualify for
trade secret protection, then the ability to protect it may depend on such factors as
whether: (1) it exists in tangible form; (2) it has been publicly disclosed; (3) its
protection can be achieved through possession and control of the physical
embodiment of the information; and (4) whether other theories of state law exist
under which such information may be characterized as property.49
The extent to which information and data that does not qualify for trade secret
protection (e.g., mere confidential or proprietary information) is property for purposes
of bankruptcy is a question that bankruptcy courts have not carefully considered.5 °
However, because trustees are charged with finding as much value in a debtor's estate
as possible, bankruptcy courts may be willing to apply a broader view of property
than state courts do when hearing trade secret claims. 5' In this regard, the Bankruptcy
48. Cf UNIF. TRADE SECRETS Acr §1 (requiring reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy in
order for protection).
49. Although intellectual property rights often exist in a tangible form, the ownership of
such rights should be thought of and treated separately from their physical embodiment. U.S.
Copyright law specifically recognizes this point in section 202 of the Copyright Act which provides
"[o]wnership of a copyright ... is distinct from ownership of any material object in which the work is
embodied." 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000). In the case of trade secrets, for instance, the paper on which a
customer list is written may be personal property even if the information that is contained on the list
does not qualify for trade secret protection. This is why some states recognize a cause of action for
conversion of intangibles when they are represented by documents and refuse to recognize such a
cause of action when there is no documentary representation. See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v.
Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., No. CV 99-09217CM (CWX), 2000 WL 33964136, at *3 (C.D. CA. 2000).
But see GS. Rasmussen & Assoc. v. Kalitta Flying Serv., Inc., 958 F.2d. 896, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1992)
(applying three part test to determine if the asserted interest was property subject to conversion under
California law). See also Kremin v. Cohen, 314 E3d 1127, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing
between exclusive and non exclusive intangibles for the purpose of determining whether intangibles
can be the subject of a conversion action).
50. Significantly, the treatment of non-trade secret information in a bankruptcy proceeding
was considered by the U.S. Senate when the definition of intellectual property was added to the
Bankruptcy Code in 1988 but the Senate's broader conception of intellectual property to include
confidential and proprietary information was not enacted into law. See S. Rep. No. 100-505 at 7-8
(1988). The Senate Report regarding section 101 (35A) of the Bankruptcy Code (then referred to as
section 101(52)) provides:
The definition of "intellectual property" is unusual for a federal statute because of its
inculsion [sic] of trade secret, normally a concept reserved for development by the states.
Because bankruptcy processes can alter rights created by state law, this inclusion is
appropriate. Also included as a separate category is confidential research or development
information. This was done because some states narrowly define trade secret, but accord
protection to the developer of confidential technical information falling outside those
definitions.
Id. See also H. Rep. No. 100-506 at 8 (1988) (explaining the limited version of the definition that
was enacted into law).
51. See, e.g., In re El Toro Exterminator of Fla., Inc., No. 05-60015-BKC-LMI 2006 Bankr.
LEXIS 2427 at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. July 6, 2006). See also In re Frontier Group, 256 B.R. 771, 773
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Code refers, not to specific items of physical property, but to "interests" in property.
52
As explained in the legislative history of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, an interest in
property includes "all interests, such as interests in real or personal property, tangible
and intangible property, choses in action, causes of action, rights such as copyrights,
trademarks, patents, and processes, contingent interests and future interests, whether
or not transferable by the debtor."53 As a practical matter, to the extent a debtor's
rights in information have value, they are likely to be treated as a property interest of
the bankruptcy estate because such treatment will enhance the value of the estate.
54
The Bankruptcy Code's broad conception of estate property as "interests" raises
the further issue whether such interests can be defined solely by contract. To borrow
from Margaret Jane Radin's conception of the issue: Is the meaning of property to be
determined by the law of the state, the law of the firm, or both? 55 This issue can arise
with respect to trade secrets because parties to a license agreement often agree that
information constitutes trade secrets even though it does not meet the statutory
definition. However, there is a well-established principle of trade secret law that trade
56secret rights cannot be created by contract. Thus, if someone agrees to treat
information of the debtor that does not qualify for trade secret protection
confidentially, is the debtor's interest in that information an asset of the estate?
Due to the bankruptcy courts' reliance on state law definitions of property, it
appears clear that bankruptcy courts would not necessarily give respect to an
agreement of parties to recognize information as "trade secrets." However, because a
(Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 2000) (commercial information is protected under 17 U.S.C. § 107(b) even if it is
not a trade secret).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2008). The Bankruptcy Code is worded as it is because Congress
wanted to apply a flexible and expansive view of what constitutes the debtor's estate. See H.R. Rep.
No. 95-595, at 52 (1978). See also Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy
Estate, 47 EMORY L.J. 1193, 1194 (1998).
53. See H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 175-76. As noted in In re Dalton, 146 B.R. 460, 462
(Bankr. D. Ariz. 1992), however, the scope of§ 541(a) is not unlimited:
Congress did not intend that property in which debtor holds only a minor interest, such as
a lien or bare legal title, become estate property," Nor was it intended to enlarge debtor's
rights beyond those existing at the petition date. A debtor may not use § 541(a) to divest
another of property to which that person has rightful title.
54. See, e.g., Board of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 6, 8-9 (1924) (holding that
the debtor's membership on the Board of Trade was property despite applicable state law that said it
was not). See also Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467,476-77 (1974); In re Sullivan, 305
B.R. 809, 826-27 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2004) (recognizing that a corporate opportunity can be
embezzled); In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. 422, 436 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) ("the
definition of'property of the estate' is to be read expansively.").
55. Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J. INST'L &
THEoREncAL ECON. 142 (2004).
56. MILGRIM, supra note 17, at § 1.03 n.8. See also Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic
Sciences Corp., 9 Mass. App. 254,278 (1980).
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debtor's contractual rights are "an interest" of the bankruptcy estate,57 presumably
such rights must be identified as a part of the estate. Unfortunately, there is little, if
any, discussion in the case law of how non-trade secret information that is the subject
of a contract is to be categorized and treated by bankruptcy courts. Clearly,
confidential and proprietary business information not meeting the definition of a trade
secret is not "intellectual property" as that term is defined in the Bankruptcy Code
and need not be defined as such on the debtor's schedules. 58 However, if such
information is an interest of the estate by virtue of it being the subject of contractual
rights, then presumably it needs to be identified elsewhere on the debtor's
schedules.
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B. Stage Two: Identifying the Property of the Bankruptcy Estate
Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor has the duty to "carefully, completely,
and accurately" identify all of its property interests. 60 This must be accomplished with
"the utmost good faith '61 and is carried out by completing and filing a schedule of
assets.62 The official form on which such disclosures are to be made includes a
reference to intellectual property as an asset that should be listed,63 and the
57. NORTON, supra note 4, § 61:6, at 61-29 ("Any interest which the debtor acquires under a
contract is included in the estate.").
58. Although intellectual property is not explicitly mentioned in 11 U.S.C. § 541(a), a
definition of intellectual property was added to the Bankruptcy Code in 1988 when 11 U.S.C.
§ 365(n) was added. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A) (2000). This definition makes reference to "trade
secrets" but does not define what they are. Based upon the law of most states, trade secrets do not
include proprietary and confidential information that does not satisfy the three requirements of the
UTSA. See note 41 supra.
59. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007, 9009 (2001) (detailing the "Lists, Schedules, and Statements"
that must be filed by the debtor and proscribes the forms to be used for such purposes). FED. R.
BANKR. P. 1007(b)(1) requires that the debtor "file schedules of assets and liabilities, a schedule of
current income and expenditures, a schedule of executory contracts and unexpired leases, and a
statement of financial affairs, prepared as prescribed by the appropriate Official Forms." Official
Form 6, Schedule B, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/titlella/lla1126htl. is
the form to be used to list personal property, including "[p]atents, copyrights, and other intellectual
property" (at line 22) and "[l]icenses, franchises, and other general intangibles" (at line 23). Schedule
G of Official Form 6 is the form to be used for the listing executory contracts and unexpired leases.
As alluded to in note 49, supra, to the extent such information is embodied in tangible form, the
physical embodiment of it may also constitute tangible personal property which should be listed
somewhere on Schedule B. Further complicating the question of where and how to list trade secrets
and confidential information is the fact that rights in information that are based upon a contract
should arguably be listed in Schedule G
60. Cusano v. Klen, 264 F.3d. 936,946 (9th Cir. 2001) (citing In re Mohring, 142 B.R. 389,
394 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992)). See also 11 U.S.C. § 521(a) (2000).
61. In re Breitling, 133F. 146, 148 (7th Cir. 1911).
62. See FED. R. BANKR. P., supra note 59, at 1007.
63. Official Form 6, Schedule B, Line 21 (on which debtors are instructed to list their
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Bankruptcy Code defines intellectual property to include trade secrets.
64
Unfortunately, nowhere in the Bankruptcy Code are trade secrets defined.65 Thus, as
a practical matter, in order for trade secrets to be included on the debtor's schedule of
personal property, the debtor must know that trade secrets are a form of intellectual
property and be familiar with the applicable definition of trade secrets.
66
There are a number of ways that trade secrets may become a part of a debtor's
estate. First, the debtor may own trade secrets by having purchased them from
another. Second, the debtor or the debtor's employees may have developed a secret
internally, either pre-petition or post-petition.67 This might occur, for instance, if the
research and development arm of the debtor discovers a cure for cancer.68 Although
this discovery is likely to be a candidate for patent protection, until a patent
application is prepared and filed and before it is published in the Patent Office's
69Official Gazette, information concerning the cure is a trade secret if it meets all of
the requirements for trade secret protection. Another way that trade secrets may play a
role in the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding is through a license agreement.70 If the
"[platents, copyrights and other intellectual property. Give particulars."), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/uscode/titlella 1 12 6.html.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(A) (2000).
65. See supra notes 58-59.
66. According to the legislative history of section 365(n)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act,
Congress apparently intended the term "trade secret" to have the meaning ascribed to it by the
UTSA. See also Chicago Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,1314 (11th Cir.
2001) (Trade secrets are not precisely defined under federal law. When determining whether
something is a trade secret, courts draw from 'commonly accepted criteria' such as the Restatement,
Uniform Trade Secrets Act and other treatises.). See supra notes 50-51.
67. According to 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (2000), an interest in property that the estate
acquires after the commencement of a bankruptcy proceeding is property of the estate.
68. Generally, in Chapter 7 cases, the property of the estate is defined as of the date the
bankruptcy petition is filed. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302, and 303 (2000). Any property that is
acquired after that date belongs to the debtor, however, there are a number of exceptions. 11 U.S.C. §
541(a)(5). An issue may arise whether an invention that was in development pre-petition, but is
perfected post-petition, is a part of the bankruptcy estate. See, e.g., Szombathy v. Controlled
Shredders, No. 97C481, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5168 (N.D. 111. Apr. 14, 1997) (post-petition
improvements made by the debtor to a device patented pre-petition do not become part of the
bankruptcy estate); Casey v. Hochman, 963 F.2d 1347, 1347 (10th Cir. 1992) (patent designed by
debtor post-petition during a Chapter 11 proceeding was not considered property of the estate). But
see In re Gucci, 202 B.R. 686, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1996) (debtor's pre-petition licensing business
was so "inexorably linked" to his post-petition design activities that the sale of the business by the
trustee and his current activities were "one in the same").
69. See Official Gazette Notices, 18 May 2004, Reminder of the Proper Procedure for Filing
Confidential Information Pursuant to MPEP 724.02, available at
http://www.uspto.gov/go/og/2004/week20/pafinfo.htm (last visited: March 6, 2008).
70. According to 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (2000), all executory contracts between the debtor and
others become a part of the bankruptcy estate upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition. It is then up
to the trustee (or debtor in possession) to determine whether to assume or reject such contracts.
2008/09]
GONZAGA LAW REVIEW
debtor is a franchisee of a restaurant chain or the licensee of computer software, the
underlying franchise or license agreement is likely to include a reference to trade
secrets or confidential and proprietary information.
71
While many debtors may own trade secrets, the identification of trade secrets
presents a particular challenge for bankruptcy courts because they do not always exist
in tangible form and because it is possible for a debtor to own trade secrets without
knowing it.72 Although debtors may know that they possess and use information that
helps them to operate their business, they are often unaware that such information has
a specified legal status. 73 Often, companies discover that they own trade secrets only
after a valuable employee leaves their employ to begin work for a competitor or to
start a competing business. 74 If the company consults an attorney to determine if it
has legal recourse against the departing employee, the attorney will work with the
client to identify potential trade secrets and to ascertain if a viable claim for
misappropriation exits. Typically, only large and sophisticated companies take steps
to identify and protect trade secrets before the defection of valued employees.
If the debtor's trade secrets are not known to the debtor or are otherwise
unscheduled on the debtor's list of personal property, then it is up to the trustee and
creditors to identify such assets if they exist.75 If the trade secrets are documented in
some written form, they should be identifiable during a careful review of the debtor's
76records. Clues to the possible existence of trade secrets may be found in
Because there is a deadline by which executory contracts must be assumed or rejected, debtors who
rely upon IP licenses in the conduct and operation of their business should act quickly to identify
such assets before the deadline passes. NoRToN, supra note 4, § 177:29, at 177-45. The deadline
under Chapter 7 is "within 60 days after the order for relief." 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1). The deadline
under Chapter 11 is "anytime before the confirmation of a plan." 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
71. See Schedule B, supra note 59, at line 22 (calling for the listing of all licenses, franchises,
and other general intangibles).
72. See NORTON, supra note 4, § 177:149, at 177-21 (noting the difficulty of articulating
trade secrets). Unlike patent rights, trade secrets are not dependent upon a government grant for their
existence. Also, unlike trademark and copyrights, there is no federal or state registration process for
trade secrets.
73. Thornton Robison, The Confidence Game: An Approach to the Law about Trade
Secrets, 25 ARiz. L. REv. 347, 382 (1983) (explaining that uncertainty over whether something is or is
not a trade secret is a "significant problem" because there is no definitive way to determine what is or
is not a trade secret before misappropriation litigation ensues); Kevin R. Casey, Identification of
Trade Secrets During Discovery: Timing and Specificity, 24 AIPLA Q.J. 191, 200-02 (1996)
(magnifying the concern that a trade secret plaintiff faces an uphill battle to list possible trade secrets
appropriated by a defendant because it often does not know which of its trade secrets has been
misappropriated of if the material in question is a trade secret).
74. See, e.g., Metallurgical Indus. v. Fourtek, Inc., 790 E2d 1195, 1198 (5th Cir. 1989).
75. Generally, unscheduled property continues to belong to the bankruptcy estate even after
the closure of the case. See, e.g., Hutchins v. IRS, 67 F.3d 40, 43 (3d Cir. 1995) ("the bankrupt estate
retains unscheduled assets") (citing 11 U.S.C. § 554(d) ("property... not abandoned under this
section .. remains property of the estate.")).
76. In Fundamentals of Bankruptcy Law, the authors argue:
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confidentiality agreements, invention assignment agreements, non-compete
agreements, and employee policy manuals, or through the receipt of royalty
payments.77 Pending or threatened trade secret misappropriation claims are also a
good source of information about the debtor's potential trade secrets assets.
78
If the debtor's trade secrets are not documented in writing and not disclosed on
the bankruptcy schedules, the only way to identify them is for the trustee and
creditors to become thoroughly familiar with the business operations of the debtor
and to examine key employees and executives about the possible existence of trade
secrets. 79 Fortunately, the Bankruptcy Code includes a number of tools that are
designed to ensure the full and honest reporting of estate assets. For instance, in a
chapter 7 case the debtor is required to cooperate with the trustee in preparing a
"complete inventory of the property of the debtor."80 Bankruptcy Rule 2004(a) allows
any party in interest, including the trustee, to petition the court to order the
examination of any entity. 8 Creditors may also examine the debtor at the meeting of
creditors.82 In all cases, great care should be taken to ensure that the unknown or
unscheduled trade secrets are not lost in the process.8 3
Whether the debtor's interest in his books, papers, or other recorded information
concerning his financial affairs is an interest in property for purpose of section 541(a)(1) is
of only academic interest, for ordinarily this financial information must be turned over to
the trustee under section 542(e).
FUNDAMENTALS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW, supra note 21, § 4.01(a). This observation, however, is
limited to financial information that is recorded in some fashion and does not cover financial
information that is not recorded or non-financial information.
77. The articulation of trade secrets will be more or less detailed depending upon whether
they stand alone or are attached to a litany of other intellectual property. For instance, it is not
uncommon for a franchise agreement to specifically identify a trade secret as "the recipe for making
franchisor's pizzas." In contrast, software license agreements, confidentiality agreements, and
employee manuals tend to be more general, often including a clause that broadly identifies "all
patents, copyrights, trade secrets, know-how, and confidential and proprietary information contained
therein." See Smith, supra note 3, at 574-76 (criticizing the court in In re Avalon Software, Inc., 209
B.R. 517 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1997), for failing to recognize the multiple and distinct intellectual property
rights that can exist in computer software).
78. The claim for trade secret misappropriation is an asset in its own right and one which a
debtor is required to separately list on its schedule of personal property. See supra note 59. Obviously,
if the debtor is the plaintiff in such an action it will have alleged the existence of trade secrets in its
complaint.
79. Outside of the bankruptcy context, this process is called an "intellectual property audit"
and a number of resources exist to assist in the conduct of such audits. See, e.g., Epstein & Levi,
supra note 44, at 898-902.
80. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2015(a), 4002(4).
81. FED. R. BANKR. P. 2004(a).
82. 11 U.S.C. § 341 (2000); see also 11 U.S.C. § 343 (2000) ("The debtor shall appear and
submit to examination under oath at the meeting of creditors under section 341(a) of this title.").
83. See In re Robert Landau Assoc's., 50 B.R. 670, 674-75 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)
(recognizing balance between creditors' needs for complete disclosure and debtor's need for
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An interesting issue that may arise with respect to the identification of trade
secrets and proprietary information concerns the use of non-compete agreements to
mask or diminish the value of assets that are transferred pre-petition.84 Typically, a
non-compete agreement accompanies the sale of a business and includes a promise
by the seller not to compete with the buyer for a limited period of time.85 Such
agreements relate to trade secret law to the extent they prevent key executives and
employees of the seller from using the knowledge, skills, and know-how they learned
in the seller's business.86 As several bankruptcy courts have recognized, a company
that is planning to file for bankruptcy protection may sell assets at an undervalued
price but couple such sale with a non-compete agreement pursuant to which the
owners or employees of the debtor receive periodic post-petition payments for their
promise not to compete. 87 To the extent the compensation that is owed under the non-
compete agreement is traceable to the property sold, it may belong to the bankruptcy
estate. 88 Thus, the possible existence of oral or written non-compete agreements
should be a subject of inquiry by trustees and creditors.
confidentiality); see also Burke Gappmayer, Protecting the Insolvent: How a Creditor s Committee
can Prevent its Constituents from Misusing a Debtor's Nonpublic Information and Preserve Chapter
11 Reorganizations, 2006 UTAH L. REv. 439, 444 (2006) ("the creditors' committee has unlimited
access to all public and nonpublic information regarding the debtor and the debtor's business,
including trade secrets, customer lists, licensing agreements, union negotiations, collective bargaining
agreements, employee negotiations, future business strategies, potential liabilities, and any other
possible related information.").
84. See, e.g., In re Andrews, 80 F3d 906, 910-911 & n.10 (4th Cir. 1996) (court found that
the buyer made the non-compete agreement and the customer lists "a condition of the sale, and made
the payments thereunder, to protect and maintain the good will it purchased from [the debtor]"); In re
Bluman 125 B.R 359, 360-61 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1991) (debtor attempted to sell the business that was
part of the estate and then collect monthly payments for the business assets and non-compete
agreement); In re Sloan, 32 B.R. 607, 611 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y 1983) (intangible assets of a business
such as customer lists and a covenant not to compete sold along with its other assets should be
considered part of the bankruptcy estate). See also infra Section WA for a discussion of how a
trustee may avoid preferential or fraudulent transfers.
85. See William G Porter II & Michael C. Griffaton, Using Noncompete Agreements to
Protect Legitimate Business Interests, 69 DEF. CoUNs. J. 194, 194 (2002).
86. According to the law of many states, non-compete agreements and other restrictive
covenants are unenforceable unless they are reasonable in scope and duration. See, e.g., California
Business and Professions Code, §§ 16600, 16601. One way to establish the reasonableness of such
restrictions is to couple the promise not to compete with a past and future obligation to maintain the
confidentiality of trade secrets.
87. In re Andrews, 80 F.3d at 911 (stating that ifthe court failed to find the
non-compete agreement part of the sale of assets, the debtor "would be able, indeed invited, to
circumvent the bankruptcy laws through clever use of agreements not to compete. Specifically,
a debtor selling a business, yet anticipating filing bankruptcy, could divert sale proceeds from the
bankruptcy estate by shifting these proceeds from pre-petition sales payments to post-petition non-
competition payments. There, as here, the post-petition non-competition payments are not part of the
debtor's fresh start efforts, but rather payments that are rooted in the debtor's pre-petition conduct.").
88. Several courts have held that compensation due to a debtor pursuant to a pre-petition
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C. Stage Three: Protection of Estate Property
Once the bankruptcy estate is created and identified, the trustee (or debtor in
possession) is required to take immediate steps to protect the property of the estate.
8 9
This is often accomplished by taking physical possession of estate property or, in the
case of intangible property, by asserting dominion over the documentary evidence or
proceeds of such rights.90 For instance, the debtor and third parties, such as lawyers
and accountants, are required to turnover the debtor's "recorded information,
including books, documents, records, and papers, relating to the debtor's property or
financial affairs." 91 Similarly, "an entity, other than a custodian," is required to
turnover all "property that the trustee may use, sell, or lease under section 363 of this
title, or that the debtor may exempt under section 522 of this title" unless it is "of
inconsequential value or benefit to the estate.' 92 Once aware of the existence of the
bankruptcy proceeding, a custodian of estate property is required to preserve it and
deliver it to the trustee.
93
The protection of trade secrets presents a number of challenges for trustees. First,
the secrets should be put under lock and key if they exist in tangible form. Second,
and perhaps more important, steps should be taken to ensure that all persons who are
or were in possession of, or who are or were given access to, such secrets are under
an ongoing and enforceable duty of confidentiality.94 This is because trade secret
rights can only be enforced to the extent that they are "misappropriated," i.e., either
agreement not to compete is not attributable to post-petition services and is thus property of the
estate. See, e.g., In re Alstad, 265 B.R. 488 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001); In re Sloan, 32 B.R. at 611.
89. 11 U.S.C. § 704 (2000) (duties of trustee in liquidation proceedings); 11 U.S.C. § 1106
(2000) (duties of trustee in reorganization proceeding); 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000) (rights, powers, and
duties of debtor in possession). See also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(3) (2000) (automatic stay provisions
which prevents any act "to obtain possession of property of the estate" or to "exercise control over
the property of the estate.").
90. 11 U.S.C. § 542 (2000). Courts that have considered whether intangible property is
subject to the turnover requirements of sections 542 and 543 have generally held that it is. Typically,
however, these cases involved money in a bank account, accounts receivable, tax returns, copyrights,
or other types of general intangibles that are evidenced in a documentary form. See, e.g., In re Bristol
Convalescent Home, 12 B.R. 448, 449, 451 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981) (holding that monies owed a
Chapter 11 debtor by the State of Connecticut were property of the estate and were subject to
turnover); In re Debmar Corp., 21 B.R. 858, 860 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (holding that pre-petition
levies on an account receivable and a bank account by the I.R.S. were property of the estate).
91. 11 U.S.C. §§ 52 1(a)(4), 542(e) (2000).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2000).
93. 11 U.S.C. § 543 (2000).
94. See supra notes 20, 43-46 and accompanying text. See also Electro-Craft Corp. v.
Controlled Motion, Inc., 332 N.W.2d. 890, 901 (Minn. 1983) (plaintiff's failure to engage in any
efforts to maintain the secrecy of its information was fatal to its trade secret claim).
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acquired by improper means or disclosed or used in violation of a duty of
confidentiality.
95
A question that bankruptcy courts have not examined but which may arise with
respect to trade secrets is whether the statutory obligations imposed on trustees,
custodians, and other entities to preserve the property of the estate96 create a duty of
confidentiality that can serve as the basis for a post-petition claim for trade secret
misappropriation.97 In other words, even if the nature of the relationship that existed
between the trade secret owner and the person in possession of the trade secrets
would not normally give rise to a duty of confidentiality, does the filing of the
bankruptcy petition convert the relationship to one where such a duty is owed? And,
if so, may a trustee, custodian, or other entity in possession of estate trade secrets be
sued for trade secret misappropriation post-petition if they wrongfully disclose or use
such secrets?
Based upon established trade secret law, certain relationships can create a duty of
confidentiality even in the absence of an express obligation. 98 For instance, an
obligation to maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets is often imposed upon
employees because many states treat employees who know or have custody of a trade
secret as having a fiduciary duty to the employer.99 This is important because, in the
absence of an express or implied duty of confidentiality, the only way trade secrets
can be misappropriated is if they are acquired improperly.'00 If the relationship
between a debtor and other participants in a bankruptcy case is fiduciary, an implied
duty of confidentiality arguably attaches to estate trade secrets wherever they exist
95. UNIFORM TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1, definition of "misappropriation" and "improper."
Section 1(2) of the UTSA provides that misappropriation may occur when a person breaches a duty
of confidentiality. According to applicable case law, such a duty may be either express or implied
and implied duties have been found to arise from a number of relationships.
96. See supra notes 89-93.
97. See Sharon K. Sandeen in TRADE SECRET PRACTICES IN CALIFORNIA, Chapter 10, §§
10.16-10.25 (2d ed. 2003) (listing the types of relationships that, based upon case law, have given rise
to a duty to maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets).
98. Id. See also Pachmayr Gun Works, Inc., v. Olin Mathieson Chem. Corp., 502 E2d 802,
807 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating that trade secret law is concerned with "protecting 'against breach of faith
and reprehensible means of learning another's secret') (citations omitted).
99. See, e.g., Panther Sys. 1i, Ltd. v. Panther Computer Sys., Inc., 783 E Supp. 53, 65
(E.D.N.Y. 1991) (quoting Churchill Communications Corp. v. Demyanovich, 668 E Supp. 207, 211
(S.D.N.Y. 1987)) ("[A]n employee's use of an employer's trade secrets or confidential customer
information can be enjoined even in the absence of a restrictive covenant when such conduct violates
a fiduciary duty owed by the former employee to his former employer."); Velo-Bind, Inc. v. Scheck,
485 F. Supp. 102, 109 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (allowing injunction where "[a]ppropriation of a former
employer's customer list [breached] the fiduciary obligation inherent in the employer/employee
relationship"); Fryetech, Inc. v. Harris, 46 F. Supp.2d 1144, 1152 (D. Kan. 1999) (all employees, not
those who are solely limited to those exercising managerial authority, have a fiduciary obligation);
see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 396 (1958); RESTATEMENt (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETrrON § 42 & cmts. b, c, & e (1995).
100. See supra note 95.
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and regardless of the relationship that existed pre-petition. '0 This, in turn, would
expose the pre-petition possessors of estate trade secrets to an increased risk of
liability for trade secret misappropriation once a bankruptcy petition is filed.10 2
What if the pre-petition possessors of estate trade secrets do not know that the
information that they possess are trade secrets? In all likelihood, no duty of
confidentiality would be implied.'0 3 This, of course, heightens the need for all parties
in interest to quickly identify estate trade secrets so that all persons in possession of
such secrets can be made aware of their duties of confidentiality. Once such secrets
are identified, rather than relying upon an implied duty of confidentiality that may be
imposed by operation of law, the trustee should exact an express promise of
confidentiality in which critical trade secrets are identified with sufficient
specificity.104
D. Stage Four: Administration, Distribution, and Discharge
Once property interests become a part of the bankruptcy estate they must be dealt
with in some fashion.'0 5 How they are dealt with partly depends upon the chapter
under which the petition is filed. A debtor reorganizing under Chapter 11 is allowed to
remain in possession of estate property subject to a strict fiduciary duty with respect
to the handling of estate assets. 1° 6 A similar rule applies to Chapter 13 debtors
although confirmation of a plan revests all property of the estate in the debtor.'0 7 If
101. See, e.g., In re Met-L-Wood Corp., 861 E2d 1012, 1019 (7th Cir. 1988) (noting that a
trustee has fiduciary duties and acts as the creditors' representative); In re REA Holding Corp., 8 B.R.
75, 81 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 1980) ("[A] creditors' committee owe[s] a fiduciary duty to all creditors
which they fulfill by advising creditors of their rights and of the proper course of action in the
bankruptcy proceeding." (citations omitted)).
102. This would be a risk over and above the penalties that are provided in the Bankruptcy
Code for the failure to turnover estate property. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 521 (2000).
103. See, e.g., Dynamics Research Corp. v. Analytic Sciences Corp., 400 N.E.2d 1274, 1283
(Mass. App. Ct. 1980) ("The employer's interest in the secret must be crystal clear to justify the
restraint of the employee, for whom it may have become part of his general knowledge and
experience.") (citations omitted).
104. If such an agreement cannot be obtained voluntarily, it may be obtained by court order.
See discussion of section 107(b) of the Bankruptcy Code infra Part II1.A
105. See FUNDAMENTALs OF BANKRUpTCY, supra note 21, at § 4.04 ("Property that becomes
part of the estate ordinarily leaves the estate in one of three ways (not counting the revesting or other
transfer of the estate's property that occurs upon or results from confirmation of a plan in a case under
one of the rehabilitation chapters): (1) by sale or other disposition under section 363,.. .(2) by the
debtor's exempting it under section 522(b)...; and (3) by an abandonment under section 554.).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2000) ("The debtor in possession shall have all the rights ... of a
trustee serving in a case under this chapter."); 11 U.S.C. § 1108 (2000) ('The trustee may operate the
debtor's business.").
107. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b) (2000).
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the debtor is proceeding under Chapter 7, then it is up to the trustee to gain control of
the estate assets and liquidate them for as much money as possible.
10 8
Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code gives the trustee (or a debtor in possession)
the power to use, sell, or lease estate property. 10 9 To the extent estate property is the
subject of a secured interest it may be foreclosed upon by the secured creditor once
the automatic stay expires or relief from the stay is obtained. 10 If the property interest
is in the form of an executory contract (such as a license agreement or franchise
agreement involving trade secrets) then the trustee must decide whether to assume or
reject the contract.' In the case of individual debtors, the property may be exempt
from treatment in bankruptcy.
1 2 Lastly, the property may be abandoned."
13
The general goal of bankruptcy proceedings is to preserve and maximize the
value of the bankruptcy estate so that creditors can be repaid to the greatest extent
possible and to allow the debtor "a fresh start."' 14 Part of the bankruptcy process
involves the payment or discharge of various claims. 115 This requires the bankruptcy
court and trustee to take account of the liabilities, as well as the assets, of the debtor.
This is done through a notice and claim process whereby creditors are allowed to file
a claim against the estate. 116 Once the creditors of the estate are identified, steps are
taken to allow or disallow the claims" 17 and to pay-off or pay-down allowed claims in
a prescribed order.
18
Trade secret issues may arise on the liability-side of bankruptcy proceedings in a
number of ways. First, the debtor may be a defendant in a lawsuit for trade secret
misappropriation or a judgment debtor on a trade secret claim. 19 Second, the debtor
may be the licensor or licensee of trade secret rights, in which case it may owe
various obligations under the terms of the license.' 20 Third, the trade secret assets of
the debtor may be pledged as security for a debt, in which case the secured creditor
108. 11 U.S.C. § 704(a)(1) (2000).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b)(1) (2000).
110. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(c), (d) (2000).
111. 11 U.S.C. §§ 365(a), (n) (2000).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 541(b) (2000).
113. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000).
114. H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, at 4-5 (1977), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963.
115. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
116. 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (2000) (describing the process in an involuntary case); II U.S.C.
§ 50 1(a) (2000) (describing the process in a voluntary case).
117. See 11 U.S.c. § 502(b) (2000).
118. See 11 U.S.c. § 507 (2000).
119. See discussion infra Section VII. See also In re Lionel L.L.C., No. 04-17324, slip op. at
3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007).
120. See discussion infra Section HI and VI. See also Menell, supra note 8, at 754
(explaining how some executory licenses may be net assets of the bankruptcy estate while others
may be net liabilities) (citing Jesse M. Fried, Executory Contracts and Performance Decisions in
Bankruptcy, 46 DuKE L.J. 517 (1996)).
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may enjoy the right to use, possess, or sell such assets. 12 1 Each of these issues is
addressed in the subsections that follow from the perspective of the various parties in
interest.
E. Stage Five: Post-Closure
When a bankruptcy proceeding is finally resolved, it is the responsibility of the
bankruptcy court to formally close the case.' 22 Once this is done, it hopes that it will
never hear from the debtor or other parties in interest again. However, section 350(b)
of the Bankruptcy Code provides that: "[a] case may be reopened to administer
assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other cause. 1 23 Often, the reopening of a
case involves either unscheduled assets, newly discovered assets, or concealed
assets. 124 Given the vagaries associated with identifying trade secrets, particularly
those that are not in tangible form, the potential for unscheduled or newly discovered
trade secrets is high. The relevant question in such cases is: What happens to trade
secrets that are not identified and administered before a bankruptcy case is closed?
Can creditors make a successful claim to such property?
It is generally recognized that when property is scheduled but not administered -
in other words, when it is not explicitly dealt with as part of the bankruptcy
proceeding - it is deemed abandoned and, thereby, returned to the ownership of the
debtor.12 5 In contrast, where property of the estate is not scheduled, and therefore not
administered, the general rule is that it remains an asset of the bankruptcy estate. 126 In
such cases, when the property is later discovered, the bankruptcy case can be
reopened and creditors can assert claims against such property.' 27 The so-called "ride-
through doctrine" may provide an exception to this rule for unscheduled executory
121. See discussion infra Section V
122. 11 U.S.C. § 350(a) (2000).
123. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000).
124. NORTON, supra note 4, at § 40:4.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 554(c) (2000). An obvious exception to this rule applies to chapter 7
liquidation proceeding where there is no debtor remaining to whom the undisclosed assets can be
"returned." See also supra note 49.
126. 11 U.S.C. § 347(a) (2000) (unclaimed property "shall be paid into the court"). Any
property remaining unclaimed under Chapters 9, 11, or 12 "becomes the property of the debtor or of
the entity acquiring the assets of the debtor under the plan." 11 U.S.C. § 347(b); see also In re
Alcom, 252 B.R. 174, 178 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2000) ("The discovery of previously undisclosed and
unadministered assets has long been a reason to reopen a case under 11 U.S.C. § 350(b)") (emphasis
included) (citing In re Menk, 241 B.R. 896, 911 (9th Cir. BAP 1999) (property that was not
scheduled and was not administered retains its status as property of the estate after closing)).
127. 11 U.S.C. § 350(b) (2000). A request to reopen a bankruptcy case should be liberally
granted, see In re Dodge, 138 B.R 602, 605 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1992), but not if the costs of reopening
a case outweigh the value of the newly discovered property, see In re Mullendore, 741 F.2d 306, 308
(lOth Cir. 1984).
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contracts. 12 8 In Chapter 7 cases, unassumed executory contracts are deemed
rejected. 129 There is no such rule in Chapter I 1 or 13 cases, 130 with the result that
executory contracts may simply become property of the debtor. This is done in the
interest of efficiency and based upon the assumption that if such contracts were
particularly valuable, they would have been identified earlier.
131
It is not clear from the existing case law whether unidentified trade secret rights
will be treated like unscheduled executory contracts that ride-through to the debtor or
like other unscheduled property of the estate that remains a part of the bankruptcy
estate.132 The efficiency justification for the ride-through of executory contracts
would seem to apply equally well to unidentified trade secrets, but no court has
addressed this issue. At a minimum, trade secret interests that are a part of the estate
by virtue of an executory contract should be treated like any other unidentified
executory contracts for purposes of the ride-through doctrine.' 
33
M. THE INTERESTS OF THE DEBTOR
The interests of a debtor in identifying and preserving trade secrets depends a
great deal upon whether the bankruptcy petition is filed under Chapter 7, 11, or 13.134
If the debtor is pursuing relief from its debts through a liquidation proceeding, then it
does not have a great incentive, other than the need to comply with applicable law, to
identify and preserve all of its assets.' 35 If all of a debtor's trade secrets are not
128. In re JZ, LLC, 357 B.R. 816, 821 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2006) ("The ride-through doctrine is
simply the traditional manner in which courts deal with executory contracts, that for some reason
were not assumed or rejected pursuant to § 365 prior to or at confirmation."); see also Donald F.
Parsons, Jr. & John D. Pimot, The Intersection of Patent Law and Bankruptcy: What Every
Practitioner Should Know, 18 DEL. LAW. 30, 31 (Winter 2000); Mark R. Campbell & Robert C.
Hastie, Executory Contracts: Retention Without Assumption in Chapter 11 - "Ride Through"
Revisited, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 33, 33-34 (Mar. 2000).
129. 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(1).
130. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(d)(2).
131. Daniel J. Bussel & Edward A. Friedler, The Limits on Assuming and Assigning
Executory Contracts, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 321, 330 n.48 (2000) (arguing that the "ride through"
doctrine may "avoid or mitigate the risk of forfeiting valuable fights that might be nonassumable or
nonassignable under the hypothetical test construction of §§ 365(c) and (0.").
132. See the discussion of the abandonment of estate property and the possible revocation of
such abandonment. See discussion infra Section III.C.
133. See, e.g., In re JZ, 357 B.R. at 821 (pre-petition license agreement between debtor-
licensor and a third party rode through to the debtor). See also discussion of the treatment of
executory contracts infra Part VI.
134. See supra notes 11-13.
135. It is a crime to intentionally fail to identify estate assets. 18 U.S.C. § 152(1) (2000).
Additionally, as the debtor experienced in the case ofln re McGee, the failure to truthfully and fully
identify estate assets may result in an action by a creditor for an order finding that certain of the
debtor's debts are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 157 B.R 966, 976 (Bankr. D. Va. 1993).
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identified, valued, and liquidated as part of a chapter 7 proceeding, it is creditors who
are primarily harmed. 13 6 The interest of the debtor in the size and nature of the
bankruptcy estate increases substantially if the proceeding is brought under chapters
11 or 13. In such cases, the debtor has a great interest in maximizing the value of the
estate and in preserving estate property because it wants to be able to continue its
business as debt free as possible. The debtor is also interested in reducing the claims
that can be brought against the estate and in avoiding non-dischargeable debts.
137
Interestingly, the filing of bankruptcy may actually enhance a debtor's ability to
protect its trade secret because it gives the trustee (or the debtor in possession) the
power and authority to require others to return estate property.138 Pursuant to the
turnover provisions of the Bankruptcy Code, third parties who are in possession of
estate property are generally required to return it on their own initiative once they
learn of the filing of the bankruptcy petition.'39 Where the return of trade secrets
belonging to the estate does not occur automatically, the trustee can call upon the
power of the bankruptcy court to force the return of such information.
140
In addition to the interest that debtors have in the identification and custody of
trade secret assets, there are a number of ancillary issues that arise as a result of the
features of trade secret law. First, there is the preservation of trade secrets and
confidential information in the bankruptcy proceeding itself.'4 1 Second, if the debtor
has liability for trade secret infringement, the question arises whether such claim is
dischargeable in bankruptcy and whether an award of injunctive relief is enforceable
against the debtor.142 Third, there is the issue of the treatment of trade secrets that are
"abandoned" back to the debtor, including whether there is any basis for the
revocation of abandonment. 143 Fourth, there is the question whether licenses that are
granted to the debtor are assignable or assumable. 144 Each of these issues is addressed
in the following subsections of this article.
136. See discussion supra section II.E (discussing how unscheduled trade secrets are handled
post petition).
137. Non-dischargeable debts are debts that are exceptions to the general "fresh start" and
discharge of the debtor's obligations. 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
138. See supra notes 89-93 and accompanying text.
139. Id.
140. See supra notes 48, 90 (discussing, as a practical matter, this power is dependent upon
whether the trade secrets exist in some tangible or documentary form and, thus, are capable of being
physically returned). See also discussion infra Section VI (explaining that it also depends upon the
status of the third party). If the third party is the licensee of trade secrets, then the obligation to return
such secrets is arguably govemed by Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code which deals with the
treatment of executory contracts. Id
141. See infra Section lII.A.
142. See infra Section II.B.
143. See infra Section I.C.
144. See infra Section LH.D.
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A. The Preservation of Trade Secrets in Bankruptcy Proceedings
Given the secrecy requirement of trade secret law and the usually non-secret
nature of court proceedings, anytime trade secrets are a subject of litigation, there is a
risk that they will be lost.145 For this reason, the UTSA includes a provision that
grants courts discretion to fashion protective orders and other orders to protect trade
146secrets during the pleading, discovery, and trial phases of litigation. Fortunately for
debtors and other parties in interest who desire to preserve trade secrets during
bankruptcy, section 107 of the Bankruptcy Code contains a broader provision: "upon
request, [the court] may issue an order to protect trade secret, confidential research,
development, or commercial information of any entity.
1 4 7
As noted in the case of In re Orion Pictures Corp., confidential commercial
information is entitled to §107(b) protection even though it is not a trade secret.
148
Additionally, unlike a similar provision contained in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
26(c)(7), section 107(b) does not require a showing of good cause.1 49 This broad view
of protectable information makes sense given the interests that are at stake. It is not
just the debtor who is interested in preserving trade secrets, but the trustee and
creditors as well. Other parties in interest also have a stake in protecting their own
trade secrets to the extent they might be forced to reveal them in the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Section 107(b) has been applied to protect a wide variety of information. For
instance, in In re the Frontier Group, LLC, the court granted the debtor's request to
treat its list of creditors as a confidential customer list.' 50 In In re Global Crossing
Ltd., the court approved a request to close the hearing on a purchase agreement in
145. According to section 107(a) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rule 5001(b), the
general rule is that all documents that are filed in a bankruptcy case and all hearings related to the
case are open to the public. 11 U.S.C. § 107(a) (2000); see also FED. R. BANKR. P. 5001(b).
146. UTSA § 5 ("In an action under this [ACT], a court shall preserve the secrecy of an
alleged trade secret by reasonable means, which may include granting protective orders in connection
with discovery proceedings, holding in-camera hearings, sealing records of the action, and ordering
any person involved in the litigation not to disclose an alleged trade secret without prior court
approval."). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (c)(7).
147. 11 U.S.C. § 107(b)(1) (2000). See also FED. R. BANKR. PRoc. 9018 (providing that the
court may issue any order which justice requires to protect "a trade secret or other confidential
research, development, or commercial information").
148. In re Orion Pictures Corp., 21 F.3d 24, 27-28 (2d Cir. 1994) (defining "commercial
information" as "information which would cause an 'unfair advantage to competitors by providing
them information as the commercial operations of the debtor' ") (intemal citations omitted).
149. Id. at 27-29; see also In re Farmland Indus., 290 B.R 364, 368 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2003)
("According to the Second Circuit, once it is established that the information sought to be protected
fits in any of the categories or definitions in § 107(b), 'the court is required to protect a requesting
interested party and has no discretion to deny the application.'") (intemal citations omitted).
150. In re Frontier Group, 256 BR 771, 774 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn 2000). See also In re Nunn,
49 B.R. 963, 965 (Bankr. E.D.Va. 1985) (sealing the debtor's customer list).
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order to prevent information about proceedings undertaken to secure regulatory
approval from being disclosed to third parties who wished to derail the sales
process.151 In In re Powell, the court sealed a bank policy manual even though it was
not a trade secret because disclosure of the manual might cause undue harm.
152
Wherever possible, section 107(b) should be used to protect the trade secret and
proprietary information of the bankruptcy estate.
B. The Dischargeability ofJudgments for Trade Secret Misappropriation
The decision of a debtor to file for bankruptcy protection is often prompted by
the commencement of a civil action or the entry of a damage award against it.' 53 This
is because pre-petition claims are ordinarily dischargeable in bankruptcy.' 54 However,
there are a number of exceptions to this rule.' 55 Of possible relevance to claims for
trade secret misappropriation, section 523(a)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that
a claim "for fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity, embezzlement,
or larceny" is a non-dischargeable debt.' 56 Similarly, section 523(a)(6) provides that
claims for "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the
property of another entity" are non-dischargeable.' 
57
As a number of cases establish, it is possible for claims for trade secret
misappropriation to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 58 However, particularly in
light of the public policy that favors dischargeability, such judgments are often found
to be dischargeable. 59 The variance in outcome is due to the fact that a bankruptcy
court's decision not to discharge a claim is dependent upon a highly fact-specific
analysis that, in the case of trade secret misappropriation, requires a careful
examination of the intent of the defendant. 
60
151. In re Global Crossing, 295 B.R. 720, 725 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2003).
152. In re Powell, 1998 Bankr. LEXIS 1427, *6 (Bankr. D. Ver. 1998); see also In re One
Moore Ford, Inc. 146 B.R. 800, 806 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. 1992) (Court sealed credit company's policy
manual from bank because it was a competitor and records were made in the ordinary course of
business under 11 U.S.C. 547(c)(2)(A)).
153. See In re Lionel, LLC, No. 04-17324, slip op. at 1-2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y 2007).
154. See 11 U.S.C. § 523 (2000).
155. Seeid.
156. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4).
157. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6).
158. See, e.g., In re Harrison, 180 Fed. Appx. 485,486 (5th Cir. 2006); In re Sarff, 242 B.R.
620, 622 (6th Cir. BAP 2000); In re Madsen, 195 F.3d 988,989-90 (8th Cir. 1999).
159. See In re Lopez 367 B.R. 99, 106-07 (9th Cir. BAP 2007) (detailing both lines of cases);
see also In re Miller, 156 F.3d 598, 606 (5th Cir. 1998) (court unwilling to rle that judgment for
trade secret misappropriation was nondischargeable without additional findings of fact) and In re
Livingston, 379 B.R. 711, 718 n.9 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007) (judgment for trade secret
misappropriation held dischargeable because it did not serve as the basis of the award of damages).
160. First, the bankruptcy court will consider the preclusive effect of the judgment. See In re
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The intricacy of, conflicts among, and errors in the case law surrounding the
dischargeability of trade secret misappropriation claims is beyond the scope of this
article. Still, it is worth noting the basic elements involved. When dealing with section
523(a)(4), the focus of the bankruptcy court's analysis is on whether the debtor:
(1) owed a fiduciary duty to the judgment-creditor; (2) engaged in embezzlement; or
(3) engaged in larceny.1
61
Although the relationships that can lead to a duty to maintain the confidentiality
of trade secrets are frequently labeled as fiduciary, they are often not the type of
fiduciary duty the breach of which can result in a non-dischargeable claim. The
fiduciary duties to which section 523(a)(4) refers are narrow:162 "[u]nder § 523(a)(4),
'fiduciary' is limited to instances involving express or technical trusts. The purported
trustee's duties must ... arise independent of any contractual obligation... [and]
must have been imposed prior to, rather than by virtue of, any claimed
misappropriation or wrong. '  For a debtor to have a fiduciary duty within the
meaning of federal bankruptcy law there must be identifiable property and "trust-
like" duties. 64 To the extent that trade secrets qualify as property, they may serve as
the required res, but whether the required trust-like duties are present depends upon
the precise nature of the relationship between the debtor and the claimant. Although
the required trust may be established by contract or by statute, 165 a contractual duty to
maintain the confidentiality of trade secrets will not necessarily create the requisite
trust-like duties. 166
Balta, 151 B.R. 506, 508 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1993) ("The Supreme Court has held that bankruptcy
courts deciding dischargeability may, in appropriate circumstances, give collateral estoppel effect to
state court decisions.") (citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279 (1991)). Next, it must identify the
elements of the underlying claim for relief and examine the record to determine the precise findings
of fact that led to the judgment. Id. ("For collateral estoppel to apply, this court must find that: (1) the
issue sought to be precluded is identical to the one litigated in a prior action; (2) the issue was actually
litigated in the prior action; (3) the prior determination resulted in a valid and final judgment; and (4)
the factual determination for which preclusion is sought was necessary to the prior outcome.").
161. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(4). In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 602 (noting that the focus of the inquiry
under section 523(a)(6) is on whether the debtor engaged in a criminal act).
162. Cf In re Femandez-Rocha, 451 F.3d 813, 815-16 (11th Cir. 2006) (noting the narrow
application of the non-dischargeability provisions, generally).
163. In re Tran, 151 F.3d 339, 342 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that Texas law did not impose a
fiduciary duty on those who were licensed to sell Texas lottery tickets) (internal citation omitted); In
re Livingston, 379 BR 711, 717 n.8. But see In re Daniel, 225 B.R_ 249, 251-52 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1998) (holding that Georgia law did impose a fiduciary duty on those who were licensed to sell
Georgia lottery tickets). See also Davis v. Aetna Acceptance Co., 293 U.S. 328, 333 (1934) (holding
that the trust upon which the fiduciary relationship relies must be an express or technical trust); In re
Blaszak, 397 F.3d 386, 390 (6th Cir. 2005); In re Garver, 116 E3d 176, 178-79 (6th Cir. 1997).
164. In re Tran, 151 E3d at 343-44.
165. In re Hutchinson, 193 B.R. 61 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).
166. In re Fox, 370 B.R. 104 (6th Cir. BAP 2007) (noting that not all agreements, even if
labeled "trusts," establish the requisite trust-like duties). Such an agreement may, however, provide a
basis for a finding of nondischargeability under I I U.S.C. § 523(a)(6). See infra note 182 and
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The absence of a trust-like fiduciary duty does not end the inquiry under section
523(a)(4) because the provision also makes nondischargeable claims for
embezzlement or larceny.' 67 The Fifth Circuit has defined embezzlement to mean:
"fraudulent appropriation of property by a person to whom such property has been
entrusted, or into whose hands it has lawfully come."' 68 This might be broad enough
to include a misappropriation of trade secrets even if the trade secrets were rightfully
acquired.169 However, the requirement of "fraudulent appropriation" will not always
be something the claimant can demonstrate. It requires "proof of the debtor's
fraudulent intent in taking the property."' 7 ° Thus, as with the willful and malicious
exception discussed infra, application of the embezzlement exception in trade secret
cases requires a finding that the debtor acted with a specific intent to defraud, an
intent that is not an essential element of a claim under the UTSA.'
71
As another court recently explained, "larceny" under section 523(a)(4) means
"felonious taking of another's personal property with intent to convert it or deprive
the owner of same."' 7 2 Thus, it too requires proof of the debtor's intent. More
accompanying text
167. In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 601 (involving a state court judgment for misappropriation of
proprietary information).
168. Id. (citing Greyhound Lines Inc. v. Thurston (In re Thurston), 18 B.R. 545, 550 (Bankr.
M.D. Ga. 1982) (quoting 3 Collier on Bankruptcy 523.14(3), 523-106 (15th ed. 1981)).
169. See, e.g., In re Brown, 237 B.R. 740, 748 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1999) (distinguishing
between larceny and embezzlement). Under the UTSA, there are three wrongful acts under the
misappropriation prong of a trade secret misappropriation claim: (1) acquisition of a trade secret by
improper means; (2) disclosure or use of a trade secret by a person who used improper means to
acquire it or who knew or had reason to know that it was acquired from someone who
misappropriated it; or (3) disclosure or use of a trade secret by a person who knew or had reason to
know that it was acquired by accident or mistake. UNWF. TRADE SECRET AcT, § 1(2).
170. In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 603 (citing Brady v. McAllister (In re Brady), 101 E3d 1165,
1173 (6th Cir. 1996) ("A creditor proves embezzlement by showing that he entrusted his property to
the debtor, the debtor appropriated the property for a use other than that for which it was entrusted,
and the circumstances indicate fraud."); In re Sokol, 170 B.R 556, 560 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994); cf
Cobum Co. v. Nicholas, 956 F.2d 110, 111 (5th Cir. 1992) (requiring an intent to defraud for a
determination of whether there has been a breach of a fiduciary relationship under § 523(a)(4)).
171. See, e.g., In re Miller, 156 F. 3d. at 603 ("One can wrongfully appropriate a trade secret
while acting under an erroneous belief of entitlement.") Generally, in contrast to patent, copyright,
and trademark infringement claims which are in the nature of strict-liability torts because they do not
require proof of any intent on behalf of the defendant, trade secret claims require proof that the
defendant was at least minimally knowledgeable of the existence of trade secrets and of the alleged
misappropriation of those secrets. Specifically, the misappropriation prong of a trade secret claim
requires that the plaintiff either prove that the trade secret was acquired through improper means,
including breach of a duty of confidence, or that the defendant disclosed or used the trade secrets
when he "knew or had reason to know" that they were acquired by improper means. UNI. TRADE
SEcRES Acr § 1(2).
172. In re Ormsby, 386 B.R. 243, 250 (E.D. Cal 2008) (quoting 4 COLLmR ON BANKRUPTCY
§ 523.10(2) (15th ed. rev.2007)).
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significantly, the Fifth Circuit ruled that larceny cannot occur if an individual or
company is in lawful possession of the trade secrets of another.173 Thus, trade secret
misappropriation claims that are brought against those who are in rightful possession
of such secrets, such as employees and vendors, apparently cannot constitute
larceny.174 However, nondischargeable debts for larceny may encompass that portion
of the UTSA which prohibits the misappropriation of trade secrets by improper
means.
Under section 523(a)(6), the critical question is whether the actions of the debtor
resulted in injury and were both "willful and malicious" as those terms are
understood and applied under the Bankruptcy Code. 175 On the issue of willfulness,
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that section 523(a)(6) requires a "deliberate or
intentional injury, not merely a deliberate or intentional act that leads to 
injury. '176
Subsequent lower court decisions have emphasized the need for "an objective
substantial certainty of harm or a subjective motive to cause harm."' 77 On the issue of
maliciousness, there is a split of authority. Some circuit courts require proof of
"special malice,"' 78 while others will accept proof of "implied malice."' 179 In either
case, application of the willful and malicious exception requires evidence that the
judgment debtor had a specific intent that is different and more exacting than the
mens rea requirement of section 1 of the UTSA. 18  The requisite intent may,
173. In re Miller, 156 F.3d at 602 (citing Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Graziano (In re Graziano), 35
B.R. 589, 594 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1983)).
174. But see In re McCoy, 189 B.R. 129 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1995) (claim against former
employee for misappropriation of trade secrets was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(4) as larceny
and under § 523(a)(6) as causing a willful and malicious injury).
175. In re Miller, 156 E3d at 601-03 (noting that the requirement of"willful and malicious"
is a unitary concept which is often analyzed under a two-step process); see also In re Ardisson, 272
B.R. 346, 356 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2001) (citing KingVision Pay Per View, Ltd. v. DeMarco (In re
DeMarco), 240 B.R. 282, 287 (Bankr. N.D. 11. 1999)); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Scope ofthe Fresh
Start in Bankruptcy: Collateral Conversions and the Dischargeability Debate, 59 GEO. WASH. L.
REv. 56, 61-89 (1990); Karen N. Fischer, Comment, The Exception to Discharge for Wllful and
Malicious Injury: The Proper Standard for Malice, 7 BANKR. DEv. J. 245, 248-59 (1990); Thomas J.
Yerbich, Dischageability: Wllful and Malicious Injury 23 ALAsKA BAR RAG No. 6 (Nov/Dec 1999)
http://touchngo.com/lglcntr/usdc/bnkrptcy/briefs/bnk52.html (last viewed March 2, 2008).
176. Kawaauhauv. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57,57(1998).
177. Miller v. J.D. Abrams, Inc. (In re Miller), 156 F.3d 598,606 (5th Cir. 1998); Williams v.
IBEW Local 520 (In re Williams), 337 F.3d 504, 509 (2003); In re Salisbury, 331 B.R 682, 687
(N.D. Miss. 2005). In practice, this standard requires courts to examine "clear and specific findings
into [the debtor's] state of mind." See Raspanti v. Keaty (In re Keaty), 397 F.3d 264, 274 (5th Cir.
2005).
178. See In re Weber, 99 B.R. 1001, 1014 (Bankr. D. Utah 1989); Grand Piano & Furniture
Co. v. Hodges (In re Hodges), 4 B.R 513, 515 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 1980).
179. See United Bank of Southgate v. Nelson, 35 B.R 766, 774 (N.D. I11. 1983); United Va.
Bank v. Fussell (In re Fussell), 15 B.R. 1016, 1022 (W.D. Va. 1981).
180. Compare supra notes 175-179, with UTSA § 1(2) (requiring that the defendant have at
least a "reason to know" that a trade secret was acquired improperly, or that the defendant disclosed
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however, be found under section 3(b) of the UTSA which sanctions the award of
exemplary damages in the case of "willful and malicious misappropriation."'1 8 1 In
some circumstances, the intentional breach of a contractual duty of confidentiality
will be treated as a nondischargeable claim.' 
82
Based upon the foregoing, it is clear that pre-petition claims for trade secret
misappropriation will be dischargeable in certain circumstances. However, some
misappropriation claims will be nondischargeable, and these almost certainly include
claims resulting from the violation of a pre petition injunction.1
83
C. The Revocation ofAbandoned Trade Secrets
As noted above, abandonment occurs when property is disclosed on the debtor's
schedule of assets but is not explicitly dealt with during the administration of the
estate.'84 "The legal effect of abandonment is to retroactively revest the debtor with
the property interest as of the date of the petition.' 85 But what if the property interest
is not scheduled in a manner that allows the trustee to determine the value of such
interest? Or, what if a trade secret interest is not scheduled as "intellectual property"
on Schedule B of Official Form 6 but, instead, is listed on Schedule G as an executory
or used a trade secret with knowledge). See also supra notes 168, 170.
181. See In re Kellerman, 980 F.2d. 737, 737, 738 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing In re Levy, 951 F.
2d. 196, 198 (9th Cir. 1991)).
182. See In re Williams, 337 F.3d. 504, 510 (5th Cir. 2003).
183. Buffalo Gyn Womenservices, Inc. v. Behn (In re Behn), 242 B.R. 229, 238 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y 1999) ("An intentional violation of the order is necessarily without 'just cause or excuse'
and cannot be viewed as not having the intention to cause the very harm to the protected persons that
order was designed to prevent."). As explained in In re Behn:
[W]hen a court of the United States ... issues an injunction or other protective order telling
a specific individual what actions will cross the line into injury to others, then damages
resulting from an intentional violation of that order as is proven either in the Bankruptcy
Court or, so long as there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the questions of volition
and violation, in the issuing court are ipso facto the result of a "willful and malicious
injury."
242 B.R. at 238. See also In re Udell, 18 E3d 403, 410 (7th Cir. 1994); In re Nyren, 187 B.R. 424,
426 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1995).
184. Section 554(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides that: "After notice and hearing, the
trustee may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to the estate or that is of
inconsequential value and benefit to the estate." 11 U.S.C. § 554(a) (2000). Abandonment may also
be ordered upon the request of a party in interest after a noticed hearing. 11 U.S.C. § 554(b).
Subsection (c) of section 554 provides that abandonment will occur automatically with respect to
property "scheduled under section 521(1)" that is not "administered at the time of the closing of a
case." 11 U.S.C. § 554(c).
185. FUNDAmENTALs OF BNKRuPrcY, supra note 21, at § 4.04, p. 189. But see United States
v. Grant, 971 F.2d 799, 806 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that the revesting should be deemed to occur as
of the time of the abandonment).
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contract? 186 Similarly, what if the debtor is not aware that information it owns enjoys
trade secret status and, therefore, lists it under some other label such as "proprietary
and confidential information?" Does the failure of the debtor to clearly identify its
trade secrets provide a basis for revoking the abandonmnent of such property to the
debtor?
Although there do not appear to be any reported cases involving undisclosed
trade secrets or proprietary information that are on point, the effect of listing an IP
right under an unclear label was the topic of the Ninth Circuit's decision in the case of
Cusano v. Klien. 187 In that case, a former member of the rock group KISS brought suit
against other members of the band for royalties he claimed were owing by virtue of
his ownership of the copyright in various songs. Because the plaintiff had previously
filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, the issue arose whether he continued to own his
copyrights or whether they had otherwise been administered by the bankruptcy court.
Because the debtor had listed his "songrights" on his schedule of assets and they were
not specifically dealt with in the reorganization plan, such rights reverted to him upon
the closure of the case.188 However, because of alleged defects in how the debtor
described and valued such rights, the defendants argued that the abandonment should
be revoked.189
After first noting that errors in the valuation of estate property do not provide a
basis for a trustee to seek the return of abandoned property, the court in Cusano
focused its attention on the alleged failure to adequately describe the subject property
interest.190 The court noted that, although abandonment is generally irrevocable,
"[r]evocation of abandonment is appropriate . . . where 'the trustee is given
incomplete or false information of the asset by the debtor, thereby foregoing a proper
investigation of the asset."1 91 The critical question in Cusano was whether the
186. See supra note 59.
187. 264 F.3d 936 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Indigo Moon Prod., LLC v. Hasbro, Inc., No.
3:05CV457-12, 2006 WL 314552, at *4 (W.D. Ky. 2006) (involving undisclosed claim for trade
secret misappropriation).
188. Cusano, 264 E3d at 945-46 (citing Stein v. United Artists Corp., 691 F.2d 885, 893 (9th
Cir. 1982)); Vreugdenhill v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 950 F.2d 524, 526 (8th Cir. 1991).
189. Cusano, 264 E 3d at 945.
190. Id. at 946.
191. Id. (citing In re Ozer, 208 B.R 630, 633 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Adair, 253 B.R.
85, 89 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2000). In re DeVore, 223 B.R 193, 198 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998). As
summarized in a recent case, there are actually three exceptions to the general rule of irrevocability:
1) where the trustee is given false or incomplete information about the asset by the debtor,
(2) where the debtor fails to list the asset altogether, and (3) where the trustee's
abandonment was the result of a mistake or inadvertence, and no undue prejudice will
result from revocation of the abandonment.
In re Johnson, 361 B.R. 903, 907 (Bankr. D. Mont. 2007) (quoting In re Gonzalez, 302 B.R. 687, 691
(2003)). With respect to item two on this list, there is actually an exception to the exception which is
known as the "ride-through doctrine." For a discussion of the ride-through doctrine, see supra
Section I.E.
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debtor's schedule of assets put the other parties to the proceeding on inquiry notice of
the existence of estate property.' 92 The court held that the debtor's use of the term
"songrights" was not so defective as to forestall a proper investigation and could be
reasonably interpreted to mean copyrights and rights to royalty payments. 19 3 Thus,
pursuant to the confirmed plan of reorganization, the debtor retained ownership in
them. 1
94
Based upon Cusano, it appears that if a description of trade secrets is
reasonably sufficient to prompt the trustee or the creditors committee to investigate
further, then it should operate to preclude creditors' subsequent efforts to revoke the
abandonment of such property to the debtor.
D. The Assumability and Assignability of Trade Secret Licenses
In the discussion that follows in section VI, this article explores the important
and oft-examined issue of how bankruptcy deals with the rights of those who license
IP from the debtor.' 95 Here, the focus is on an equally important issue: whether a
debtor's pre-petition rights as a licensee of IP are assumable and assignable.' 96 While
the general rule is that all executory contacts can be assumed, assigned, or rejected,' 97
due to the perceived personal nature of IP licenses, licensors of IP rights have
successfully objected to the assumption of such agreements. 98
192. Cusano, 264 F.3d at 946 (stating: Is the description of property on the schedules "so
defective that it would forestall a proper investigation of the asset"?).
193. Id. at 946-47.
194. In contrast, the debtor's right to unpaid pre-petition royalties and other damages which
accrued pre-petition, which the debtor had not listed, did not revert to the debtor and remained in the
estate. Id. at 947-48.
195. As a threshold matter, whether an IP license can be assumed or rejected depends upon
whether it is an executory contract. 11 U.S.C. § 365 (2000). See also Vein Countryman, Executory
Contracts in Bankruptcy, 57 MINN. L. REv. 439, 439 (1973); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Functional
Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 MINN. L. REv. 227 (1989); Michael T Andrew, Executory
Contracts Revisited.- A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1 (1991); Madlyn Gleich
Primoff & Erica G Weinberger, E-Commerce and Dot-Com Bankruptcies: Assumption, Assignment
and Rejection of Executory Contracts, Including Intellectual Property Agreements, and Related
Issues Under Sections 365(C), 365(E) and 365(N) of the Bankruptcy Code, 8 AM. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 307, 310 (2000) ("While the term 'executory contract' is not defined in the Bankruptcy Code,
the legislative history of and case law under section 365 rely on the Countryman definition-i.e.,
'contracts on which performance remains due to some extent on both sides.').
196. See Michelle Morgan Hamer, Carl E. Black & Eric R. Goodman, Debtors Beware: The
Expanding Universe of Non-Assumable/Non-Assignable Contracts in Bankruptcy, 13 AM. BANKR.
INsT. L. REv. 187, 232-33 (2005). See also In re Allentown Ambassadors, 361 B.R. 422, 449 (Bankr.
E.D. Pa. 2007) (providing an overview of the issues and a list of pertinent cases).
197. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2000).
198. Generally, there are two competing tests for dealing with the assumption of lP licenses.
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With respect to all executory contracts, the critical question under applicable
bankruptcy law is whether they are the type of contract that is not assumable under
nonbankruptcy law. 199 Specifically with respect to trade secret licenses, the issue is
whether they are in the nature of a personal services contract. 200 If so, then absent the
approval of the licensor, the estate cannot benefit from the continued use of the
licensed IP. Obviously, the rejection of IP licenses can have a significant effect on the
bankruptcy proceeding, particularly in a Chapter 11 case, if the major asset of the
debtor is the income it derives from ongoing operations.
20 1
Whether a contract is one for personal services is a factual question to be
resolved under state law after considering all facts and circumstances. 212 The mere
The first is the so-called "hypothetical test" of Catapult and its progeny. See In re Catapult Entm't,
Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th Cir. 2004) (copyright
license); In re O'Connor, 258 F.3d 392 (5th Cir. 2001) (partnership agreement). See also Roger A.
Clement, Jr., Going for Broke with Intellectual Property, 17 ME. B.J. 178, 184 (2002). Under this
test, assumption is almost never possible. The second test is the so-called "actual test." Courts that
apply this test examine whether there is a material change in the identity of the person who is
rendering the services, and if not, the license may be assumed. See Institut Pasteur v. Cambridge
Biotech Corp., 104 F.3d 489, 493 (1st Cir. 1997).
For a discussion of section 365(c)(1) as it applies to IP licenses, see generally Madlyn (G
Primoffet al., supra note 195. See also Daniel J. Bussel et al., supra note 131, at 338-39.
199. Section 365(c) provides, in pertinent part:
The trustee may not assume or assign any executory contract or unexpired lease of the
debtor, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts assignment of rights or
duties, if-
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the debtor, to such contract or lease from
accepting performance from or rendering performance to an entity other than the debtor or
the debtor in possession, whether or not such contract or lease prohibits or restricts
assignment or rights or delegation of duties; and
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption or assignment....
11 U.S.C. § 365(c). As explained in In re CFLC, Inc., 174 B.R. 119, 121 (N.D. Cal. 1994), "[t]his
language is interpreted as prohibiting the trustee from assigning over objection a contract of the sort
that applicable law makes non assignable when the contract itself is silent about the assignment." In
this regard, each of the four principal IP disciplines, including trade secret law, have different histories
and rules concerning the assignability of licenses involving such rights and each area of law should
be separately researched and considered to detennine the circumstances under which assignment is
allowed, if at all.
200. As noted in the case of In re Lil' Things, Inc., 220 B.R. 583, 586 (Bankr. N. D. Tex.
1998), there is a split of authority on the question of whether section 365(c)(1) applies only to
personal services contracts. For the broader view, see In re Pioneer Ford Sales, Inc., 729 F.2d 27, 28-
29 (1st Cir. 1984) (noting that the language of § 365(c)(1)(A) is not limited to personal service
contracts).
201. This fact may explain the reluctance of some bankruptcy courts to find that franchise
agreements are non-assumable. See, e.g., In re James Cable Partners, LP, 27 F.3d. 534 (11th Cir.
1994) (involving a municipal cable franchise); In re Sunrise Restaurants, Inc. 135 B.R 149 (Bankr.
M.D. Fla. 1991) (involving a Burger King franchise).
202. In re Health Plan of Redlands, 286 B.R. 407, 409 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2002) (citing In re
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fact that an individual is performing a service is not enough, "there must be a special
relationship between the parties, or the party to perform must possess special
knowledge or a unique skill, such that no performance save that of the contracting
party could.., meet the obligations of the contract. '20 3 Generally, "the test is whether
the contract involves a personal relation of confidence between the parties or relies on
the character and personal ability of a party.
''2 °4
No bankruptcy case could be found that addresses whether an executory trade
secret license is a personal services contract and, therefore, is unassumable under
section 365(c)(1). 20 5 On the surface, given the need of trade secrets owners to
exercise reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of their trade secrets and the
206importance of relationships to a trade secret claim, an argument can be made that a
debtor-licensee's duty is personal in nature. Because trade secrets are lost once they
become generally available, trade secret licensors have a critical interest in knowing
and approving the identity of the individuals and companies that will be given access
to their secrets and in ensuring that they have the personal integrity and skills to
protect such secrets.207 However, whether a given trade secret license is personal in
nature ultimately depends upon the actual relationship between the debtor and the
licensor, the terms of the license agreement itself, and whether the debtor is an
individual or a business.20 8 If the debtor is a business, arguably the licensor was not
relying upon the debtor's personal character and skill in deciding whether to share its
trade secrets.
20 9
The assumability of executory license and franchise agreements presents a
special case when those agreements are coupled with a covenant not to compete.21 °
Headquarters Dodge, Inc., 13 F.3d 674, 683 (3rd Cir.1993)).
203. ld. (citing In re Rooster, Inc., 100 B.R 228, 233 (Bankr. E.D. Pa 1989)).
204. Id. (citing Coykendall v. Jackson, 17 Cal.App.2d 729,731,62 P.2d 746 (1936)).
205. Pursuant to applicable patent and copyright law, it is well-established that non-exclusive
patent and copyright licenses are not assignable without the consent of the licensor. See In re CFLC,
89 F.3d 673,679 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Patient Educ. Media, Inc., 210 B.1 237, 243 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y
1997). In the recent case of In re Wellington Vision, Inc., a nonexclusive trademark license was held
to be non-assignable as well. 364 B.R. 129 (S.D. Fla. 2007).
206. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
207. Perthou v. Steward, 243 F. Supp. 655, 659 (D.C. Or. 1965) ('The fact that a person may
have confidence in the character or personality of one employer does not mean that the employee
would be willing to suffer a restraint on his freedom for the benefit of a stranger to the original
undertaking.").
208. As was succinctly stated in the case of In re Headquarters Dodge, Inc: "determining
whether a contract is personal in nature depends 'upon the nature of the subject of the contract, the
circumstances of the case and the intent of the parties to the contract."' In re Headquarters Dodge,
Inc., No. 90-25863, 1992 WL 437432, at *7 (D.N.J. 1992) (citing 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY §
365.05 (Lawrence P. King, ed., 15th ed., 1992)).
209. But see In re Rooster Inc., 100 B.R. at 233, n. 12 (noting that it is possible for a
corporation to enter into an agreement that is dependent on personal service).
210. See Erin Brisbay McMahon, Covenants Not to Compete: Bankruptcy Issues, 4 J.
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On one hand, an individual's promise not to compete appears to be so personal in
nature that the agreement cannot be assumed. On the other hand, debtors who enter
into covenants not to compete should not be allowed to avoid their obligations by
declaring bankruptcy and thereafter rejecting the agreement to which such obligations
attach. Accordingly, most courts find a way to impose a continuing obligation on
debtors to abide by pre-petition noncompete agreements, provided that such
agreements are otherwise enforceable under applicable state law.2 '
IV. THE INTERESTS OF THE TRUSTEE
Generally, it is the job of the trustee to identify all of the assets of the bankruptcy
estate, to obtain maximum value from such assets, and to ensure that only legitimate
claims are made against the estate. 12 While the debtor is required to identify all of its
assets and liabilities, given the vagaries of the identification process, the trustee has a
great interest in obtaining sufficient information so that she can test the veracity of the
debtor's schedules.2 13 The trustee also must acquire sufficient information to
detennine whether to allow or disallow creditors' claims.
214
Assuming that there are trade secrets and proprietary information in the
bankruptcy estate, the trustee has an interest in taking steps to secure such assets.215 If
the debtor is a licensee or licensor of trade secrets under an executory contract, the
trustee must decide whether to assume or reject the contract.21 6 The trustee also has
an interest in avoiding pre-petition transfers that serve to diminish the worth of the
bankruptcy estate. In the event that estate trade secrets are infiringed during the
pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, the trustee (or debtor-in-possession) also has
an interest in pursuing a trade secret misappropriation claim. The first two of these
issues were addressed in previous sections of this article. The final two are addressed
in the subsections that follow.
BANKR.L.&PRAc. 115, 118-21(1995).
211. See Kennedy v. Medicap Pharmacies, Inc., 267 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001); In re Udell, 18
E3d 403 (7th Cir. 1994) (both declining to treat the right to an injunction to enforce a covenant not to
compete as a claim, with the result that it could not be discharged in bankruptcy). But cf In re
Schneeweiss, 233 B.R. 28, 31-32 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y 1998) (holding that a non-compete agreement
does not call for the performance of a service and, in any event, is not an executory contract).
212. 11 U.S.C. § 1106(2000). See also Daniel B. Bogart, Liability of Directors of Chapter 11
Debtors in Possession: "Don't Look Back--Something May be Gaining on You," 68 AM. BANKR. L.J.
155,186 (1994).
213. See supra section ll.B.
214. See supra section H.B.
215. See supra Section l.B.
216. See supra Section ll.D.
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A. Avoiding Pre-petition Transfers of Trade Secrets
In addition to being obligated and authorized to gain control of estate property,
trustees have standing, in certain circumstances, to demand the return of property that
was transferred pre-petition. 217 The general purpose of this power is to prevent
debtors from distributing plum assets of their business before declaring bankruptcy
and from favoring some creditors over others. Section 548(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy
Code provides one of the principal sources of authority for a trustee to obtain an order
avoiding the fraudulent transfer of property.218 It covers two different types of
fraudulent transfers: (1) those made with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any
entity to which the debtor was indebted at the time; and (2) those for which the debtor
did not receive reasonably equivalent value in return. Both types reach transfers made
within two years of the date of the bankruptcy petition.21
9
Theoretically, trade secrets should be treated like any other asset of the pre-
petition estate for purposes of section 548(a). If there is evidence that ownership of
trade secrets was fraudulently transferred pre-petition, the bankruptcy court has the
power to avoid the transfer and order that the trade secrets be tumed-over to the
estate. 22 In practice, however, the non-rivalrous and intangible nature of trade secrets
is likely to render such an order ineffectual. 22 1 Obviously, trade secrets that are not
222documented in writing cannot easily be "returned" to the estate. If they exist only
in the mind or expertise of a former owner or employee of the debtor, the only way
they can be physically returned is through a process of documentation which,
depending upon the nature of the secrets, may be difficult to fully capture in
223writing. Additionally, the very act of documenting the trade secrets can increase the
risk that they will be publicly disclosed and lost forever. Even if they can be captured
in a manner that allows for their physical return, they cannot be magically excised
from the minds of those who were privy to the secrets. Thus, to fully protect the trade
secrets of the estate, the trustee should consider initiating litigation against anyone
217. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 548 (2000).
218. Another source of such authority is section 544(b), which authorizes the trustee to use
whatever avoidance powers may exist under non-bankruptcy law, such as the Uniform Fraudulent
Transfer Act. See 1t U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (2000).
219. See In re Accurate Home Inspectors, Inc., 348 B.R 354, 357-58 (Bankr. E.D. La. 2005).
Note, 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) was amended in 2005 to change the time period from one to two years.
Pub. L. 109-8, § 1402(l), (2).
220. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a).
221. For an overview of the difficulties of identifying and securing intangible property, see In
re Allentown Ambassadors, 361 B.R. 422, 437 n.33.
222. MILGRIM, supra note 17, at § 2.06[l], p. 2-43 ("But a trade secret can by its nature be
"delivered" to the purchaser and yet still be "retained" by the seller.").
223. To borrow a line from the Sound ofMusic that illustrates this point: "How do you solve a
problem like Maria?"
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who has or threatens to misappropriate such secrets with the goal of obtaining an
injunction prohibiting the disclosure and use of estate trade secrets.
B. Pursuing Trade Secret Infringement Claims During the Pendancy of the
Bankruptcy Proceeding
The trustee (or debtor in possession) is obligated to act expeditiously to identify
and preserve estate assets.22 4 Due to the unique nature of trade secrets - specifically,
the fact that they may be lost if not protected - this may require that a lawsuit be
brought for trade secret misappropriation.225 Due to the limited jurisdiction of the
Bankruptcy Courts, consideration must be given to whether the bankruptcy court has
jurisdiction to hear such a case or whether it must instead be filed in a federal district
or state court.226 The answer to this question depends upon whether the trade secret
misappropriation claim is a "core" or "non-core" proceeding.
227
Section 157 of Title 28 of the United States Code sets forth a non-exclusive list
of court proceedings that are considered "core proceedings" that can be heard by a
bankruptcy court.221 While this list does not explicitly mention trade secret claims,
there are a number of proceedings which, depending upon the purpose and facts of a
particular action, may involve trade secret assets. For instance, section 157(b)(2)(A)
defines "matters concerning administration of the estate" as a core proceeding.
Section 157(b)(2)(E) lists "orders to turn over property of the estate." Pursuant to
sections 157(b)(2)(H) and (I), respectively, "proceedings to determine, avoid, or
recover fraudulent conveyances" and "determinations as to the dischargeability of
particular debts" are core proceedings.
Because the list in section 157 is non-exclusive, the analysis of what constitutes a
core proceeding ultimately depends on the general question whether the proceeding
"arises under Title 11" or "arises in a case under Title 11 .,,229 This must be determined
on a case-by-case basis and depends upon the precise nature of the case and whether
the alleged wrongdoing occurred before or after the petition. For instance, in In re
Pixius Communications, the court held that the debtor's trade secret misappropriation
224. See supra section H.C.
225. See, e.g., In re Wilson, 355 B.R. 600 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 2006) (action for
misappropriation of trade secrets); In re Bob Nicholas Enter., Inc., 358 B.R. 693 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
2007) (adversary proceeding to recover alleged trade secrets); In re Acqua Clear Tech., Inc., 361 BR
567 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2007) (adversary proceeding to avoid fraudulent transfers and require turnover
of estate property).
226. Cf 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2000) (generally limiting the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts to
"core proceedings" and related proceedings).
227. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). See also, Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line,
Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
228. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2); see also In re United Methodist Youthville, Inc., 289 B.R. 754,
757 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2003).
229. Control Center, LLC v. Lauer, 288 B.R. 269,276 (M.D. Fla. 2002).
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claims were a core proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(A) because they pertained
to the administration of the estate.230 A critical fact supporting the decision was the
finding that the debtor's claims were based upon alleged post-petition wrongdoing
(i.e., wrongdoing against the estate). 231 Similarly, in In re Nutri/Systems, Inc., the
court cited the post-petition behavior of the defendant/franchisee as establishing the
232core nature of the proceeding.
Ultimately, the decision to pursue a trade secret misappropriation claim should
depend upon whether the claim is worth pursuing. As with all potential litigation, this
requires a cost/benefit analysis to determine whether the likely return on the claim is
more than the expense of litigation. If the alleged trade secrets are a principal asset of
the estate, this decision may be easy. But it will depend upon the current value and
useful life of the trade secret. If the trustee (or debtor in possession) fails to act
quickly to protect such trade secrets during the early stages of the bankruptcy
proceeding, there will be nothing to fight over.
V THE INTERESTS OF CREDITORS
The principal interest of creditors is to make certain that their claims are repaid to
the greatest extent possible. Thus, like the bankruptcy court and trustee, they have a
great interest in ensuring that all of the assets of the debtor are properly identified and
valued. The interests of creditors diverge, however, depending upon whether they are
secured or unsecured creditors.
A. The Interests of Secured Creditors
The smart lender will not give a loan unless the borrower pledges sufficient
collateral to cover the loan in the case of a default by the borrower. Like other
property interests, trade secret rights can serve as security for a loan. Given the
intangible nature of trade secrets, however, care must be taken by the lender to ensure
that it has perfected its security interest.233 Generally, there are four steps in this
process: (1) the property that will serve as collateral is identified; (2) the borrower's
ownership of that property is confirmed; (3) a written security agreement is executed
between the lender and the borrower; and (4) the security interest is perfected,
typically by filing a financing statement in the appropriate governmental office. Three
230. In re Pixius Commc'n, LLC, 2005 WL 2850297 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2005), at 2-3 (finding
that a trade secret claim based upon post-petition activities was a core proceeding). But see Lauer,
288 B.R. at 277 (finding that a claim for trade secret misappropriation was not a core proceeding).
231. In re Pixius Commc 'n, 2005 WL 2850297, at 3.
232. 159 B.R. 725, 726-27 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
233. Security interests in personal property are perfected either by taking physical control of
the property or entering into a security agreement. Since trade secrets do not always exist in tangible
form, the latter option is the best way to perfect a security interest in trade secrets.
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prerequisites must be met in order to create a security interest which "attaches" and is
enforceable against the debtor or a third party: (1) the collateral must be in the
possession of the secured party or the debtor must sign a security agreement that
describes the collateral; (2) value must be given; and (3) the debtor must have rights
in the collateral.234 Lenders who succeed in perfecting their security interests are
secured creditors under the Bankruptcy Code and, "as a general rule, [their security
interests] pass through the bankruptcy unaffected.2 35
The failure of a security agreement to properly identify property that is the
subject of the lender's security interest means that such property is available for
general administration by the bankruptcy CoUrt.23 6 Section 9-108(a) of the Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) provides that a description of personal property in a
security agreement is sufficient "whether or not it is specific, if it reasonably identifies
what is described." Thus; in order to adequately identify trade secrets as the subject of
a security agreement, it might suffice to list "trade secrets" in the litany of property to
which the security interest attaches.237 On the other hand, more particularity may be
required, in which case care must be taken to adequately describe the trade secrets in
a manner that does result in their disclosure. 238 Because all IP, including trade secrets,
are classified as "general intangibles" under Article 9,239 and the Code makes it clear
that describing the collateral by its U.C.C. classification is sufficient,240 a security
agreement that includes general intangibles in its collateral description should be
sufficient to encumber all of the debtor's trade secrets. 241 However, because the term
234. See U.C.C. § 9-203(b)(l)-(3). The Article 9 requirement that the debtor have "property
rights" in the pledged collateral highlights the importance of both identifying information and data
that the debtor claims to own and being able to characterize such information and data as "property."
Because not all information and data will qualify for trade secret protection, as discussed infra, for
Article 9 purposes a different theory of state law must exist that would support the characterization of
non- trade secret information as property that can be the subject of a security interest.
235. NORTON, supra note 4, at § 177:20.
236. Smith, supra note 3, at 556 ("if the asset is not included in the description of goods
covered by the security interest, the lender does not have a priority interest in the asset.").
237. Cf id at 563 ("[n]o case law discusses what is minimally required for an adequate
description of trade secrets.").
238. Id.at562.
239. U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
240. U.C.C. § 9-108(b)(3).
241. See id at 556. See also Cynthia Grant, Description of the Collateral Under Revised
Article 9,4 DEPAuL Bus. & COMM. L.J. 235,269 (Winter 2006).
Courts generally find a listed general intangible "property" and thus subject to a bankruptcy
trust. See, e.g., In re Mid-West Motors, Inc., 82 B.R. 439,442 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1988) ("FDIC's lien
on general intangibles includes the payments made by the buyer with respect to the covenant not to
compete"); In re Griffith, 194 B.R. 262, 267 (Bankr. E.D. Okla 1996) (creditor perfected a security
interest in a noncompete covenant with debtor-farmer); In re Prince, 85 E3d 314, 321-22 (7th Cir.
1996) (noncompete agreement considered integral to a sale of assets). See also Xuan-Thao Nguyen,
Collateralizing Intellectual Property, 42 GA. L. REv. 1, 32 (2007) (criticizing the failure of the U.C.C.
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"general intangibles" does not include accounts or commercial tort claims,242 a
collateral description limited to general intangibles would not normally be sufficient
to cover royalty payments due or to become due to the debtor under a license of its
trade secrets,243 or claims for trade secret misappropriation, or other business torts
which often accompany trade secret claims.244 Use of the broad term "general
intangible" would also seem to exclude the tangible embodiment of trade secrets that
are treated as "goods. 245 Thus, if a lender wants to be sure to have a security interest
in the debtor's trade secrets and related property, the lender should separately list and
carefully categorize those property interests instead of relying solely on the use of the
term "general intangibles. '2 46 This, of course, would require the creditor to actually
identify the subject trade secret assets and may serve the added benefit of enabling the
creditor to more accurately value the debtor assets.
Even if a lender's security interest in the debtor's trade secrets has attached, the
lender must take steps to perfect its security interest or risk losing (1) priority to
another secured party,24 7 or (2) the entire security interest to a good faith purchaser,
248
or bankruptcy trustee.24 9 Perfection can be accomplished by completing a financing
statement (known as a U.C.C.-1) and filing it with the proper government
authorities.250 Because there is no federal registration or recordation schema for trade
secrets, an issue that has surrounded the perfection of security interests in patents,
copyrights, and trademarks - whether notice of the lender's interest must be filed at
to require specific reference to IP in security agreements).
242. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(42).
243. A right to payment arising from property licensed is an "account." See U.C.C.
§ 9-102(a)(2)(i).
244. See U.C.C. § 9-102(a)(13) (defining "commercial tort claim").
However, because a security interest automatically extends to identifiable proceeds of the
original collateral, see U.C.C. § 9-315(a)(2), the royalties from a license of trade secrets and a claim
for misappropriation of trade secrets would be covered by a security interest in general intangibles if
the security interest attached before the right to royalties or the misappropriation claim arose.
245. Article 9 defines "good" as "all things that are movable when a security interest
attaches," including a computer program embedded in goods. U.C.C. § 9,102(a)(44). But cf United
States v. Antenna Sys., Inc., 251 E Supp. 1013, 1015-16 (D.N.H. 1966) (ruling that confidential blue
prints and technical data were "general intangibles," not "goods").
246. Smith, supra note 3, at 556-58 (discussing United States v. Antenna Systems, Inc., 251
F. Supp. 1013). See also U.C.C. § 9-108(e) (a description of property only by type of collateral is not
sufficient to describe a commercial tort claim).
247. See U.C.C. § 9-322(a)(2).
248. See U.C.C. § 9-317(d).
249. See II U.S.C. § 544(a)(1) (2000) (giving the trustee the status of a someone with a
judicial lien on all property of the debtor in which a creditor can obtain a judicial lien). If state law
does not provide for judicial liens on intangible assets such as trade secrets, the lender's failure to
perfect may not lead to avoidance of the security interest by the trustee.
250. See U.C.C. §§ 9-310(a), 9-102(a)(37), 9-501, 9-516(a).
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the state level, the federal level, or both - does not affect trade secrets.25' Perfection
of security interests in trade secrets is governed solely by state law, and thus filing a
U.C.C. financing statement in the appropriate state office should suffice.252 However,
where the trade secret asset also consists of overlapping copyright, patent or
trademark protection, care should be exercised to determine if the security agreement
must also be filed with federal authorities in order to be a perfect security interest in
such assets.
253
B. The Interests of Unsecured Creditors
The principal interest of unsecured creditors is to make sure that something
remains of the bankruptcy estate after all of the secured debts are paid. Then, they
want to be first in line to receive what is left. To the extent the estate includes interests
in trade secrets, the unsecured creditor, like the secured creditor, wants those assets to
be identified and highly valued. But unlike the secured creditor, the unsecured
creditor does not want those assets to be subject to a perfected security interest.
Generally, the more unencumbered property the bankruptcy estate contains, the better
the chances are for the unsecured creditor to receive payment.
VI. THE INTERESTS OF TRADE SECRET LICENSEES
If a debtor owns trade secrets and has licensed those secrets to others, the
licensees have a great interest in being able to continue to use those secrets after the
bankruptcy petition is filed. This is particularly true with respect to IP assets that are
an integral part of a licensee's ongoing business operations. Thus, licensees of the
debtor's trade secrets are very interested in efforts by the debtor, the trustee, and the
254court to maintain the trade secret status of licensed information. They also have an
interest in ensuring that their license to use the trade secrets survives the bankruptcy
proceeding.
Given the vagaries of trade secret law, particularly the ability of others to
discover them through reverse engineering or independent discovery, the licensor of
trade secret assets cannot guarantee that its trade secrets will remain secret for all
time. However, it can, and usually does, represent and warrant in the license
agreement that it will engage in reasonable efforts to maintain the confidentiality of
251. Smith, supra note 3, at 564-65 (detailing the process for perfecting a security interest in
trade secrets).
252. d
253. Id. at 574-578.
254. Although the estate's loss of trade secret rights would allow a trade secret licensee to use
the former trade secrets without any obligation to the estate, often the existence of trade secrets and
the ability to use such secrets under a license gives the licensee an advantage that is not enjoyed by its
competitors.
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such secrets. When the licensor of trade secrets declares bankruptcy, the trustee (or
the debtor in possession) may well wish to assume responsibility for securing and
protecting such assets both for the benefit of the estate and for licensees. In other
words, failure to protect the trade secrets might both jeopardize the revenue due from
the licensee and increase the claims on the estate by giving the licensee an action for
breach. Nevertheless, pursuant to section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, the trustee has
the option to either assume or reject all executory contracts, including license
agreements in which the debtor is the licensor.255 In some cases, it may make sense
to reject existing licenses if new, more lucrative licenses can be obtained.
Because companies often build their businesses around IP that is licensed to
them by others, those businesses could be jeopardized by rejection of the technology
license agreement under section 365(n)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code. Section 365(n)(1)
provides that if the trustee (or debtor in possession) rejects an executory contract
under which the debtor was a licensor of intellectual property, the licensee may elect:
to retain its rights (including a right to enforce any exclusivity provision of such
contract, but excluding any other right under applicable nonbankruptcy law to
specific performance of such contract) under such contract and under any
agreement supplementary to such contract, to such intellectual property
(including any embodiment of such intellectual property to the extent protected
by applicable nonbankruptcy law), as such rights existed immediately before the
case commenced.256
Executory license agreements that involve trade secrets clearly fall within the
defined scope of section 365(n) because "trade secrets" are included in the definition
of intellectual property that was added to the Bankruptcy Code at the time of the
257adoption of section 365(n). Thus, under this rule, the licensee has the power to
retain the licensed trade secrets despite rejection of the license agreement. That said,
an interesting issue that has gone unaddressed by the bankruptcy courts is whether the
information that was licensed actually qualifies as a trade secret as that term is
defined under the UTSA. To the extent a rejected executory license agreement allows
the licensee to use "confidential and proprietary information" not rising to the level of
a trade secret or other non-IP assets, the section 365(n) exception may not apply.
Thus, the need to determine whether licensed information is, in fact, a trade secret is
critical to a licensees' right under section 365(n) and should not be glossed over by
bankruptcy courts.
255. See supra notes 195-204 and accompanying text
256. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n)(1) (2000).
257. I1 U.S.C. § 101(35A)(A)(2000).
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VII. CONCLUSION
As the foregoing examination of trade secrets in bankruptcy reveals, there are
numerous issues that may arise when trade secrets are part of a bankruptcy estate.
Unfortunately, because 1P assets are often thought of and treated as one amorphous
asset, a rich body of law concerning the treatment of trade secrets in bankruptcy has
yet to develop. While this article identifies and analyzes many of the issues that
bankruptcy trustees, attorneys, and judges may encounter when dealing With trade
secret related assets, there are undoubtedly more issues that may arise in the complex
and convoluted world of bankruptcy law. At a minimum, the fleeting and ethereal
nature of trade secrets demands that special efforts be undertaken to ensure that trade
secrets that do exist in a bankruptcy estate are not lost through ignorance and
inadvertence. This requires not only an understanding of the broad theoretical scope
of trade secret protection, but an appreciation of the business activities of the debtor
and the limits of trade secret protection.
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